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Part 6

# ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
## UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 2, 1983

**Part 6**

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# ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice at 2:13 p.m., in room SD–138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Goldwater, Warner, Quayle, Nunn, Kennedy, and Bingaman.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; James G. Roche, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Patrick A. Tucker, counsel; Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority; Drew A. Harker, Judith A. Freedman, and Douglas R. Graham, research assistants; Louis W. Arny III, Michael B. Donley, George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, José E. Martinez, Bruce D. Porter, Patrick L. Renehan, Carl M. Smith, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Tamara L. Farnsworth, Jacquie S. O'Grady, and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Patrick McKim, and Mark J. Albrecht, assistants to Senator Wilson; Larry Siegel, assistant to Senator Cohen; Arnold L. Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; James Steinberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy; and Ed McGaffigan, assistant to Senator Bingaman.

## OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

This is the sixth in a series of hearings concerning the organization of the Department of Defense. The hearings are focusing on the structure and roles of and the relationship between the various branches of that Department, and the relationship of the Department of Defense with other executive branch agencies.

In the five previous hearings on this subject, we have heard from a number of witnesses with broad and impressive experience in defense organizational matters.

This hearing is the first of two hearings the committee will be holding on the military departments. The second hearing on this subject is scheduled for next Wednesday, November 9, at 10 a.m.

Today we will focus our attention primarily on the role and organization of the civilian Secretaries and the secretariats of the three military departments.

Our witnesses today will appear as two panels. In the case of each panel, the witnesses will be given an opportunity to make a brief opening statement. Then the panel members may be questioned.

Our witnesses are especially well qualified to speak on the role of the organization of the military department secretariat.

Our first panel is composed of the present Secretaries of the military departments, Hon. John Marsh, Hon. John Lehman, and Hon. Verne Orr.

The second panel is composed of Dr. John L. McLucas and R. James Woolsey.

Dr. McLucas is president of the Communications Satellite Corp. Dr. McLucas has had extensive Government experience serving as Under Secretary of the Air Force from 1969 to 1973, then as Secretary of the Air Force in 1973 to 1975. He then served as Federal Aviation Administrator in 1975 to 1977.

Mr. Woolsey likewise has impressive Government service. From 1969 to 1970, he was the program analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the SALT talks. In 1970, after a brief tour on the National Security Council staff, Mr. Woolsey became general counsel of this committee, which he served until 1973. Then during 1977–79, Mr. Woolsey served as the Under Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Woolsey is now a partner in the law firm of Shade & Gardner in Washington.

He also served as delegate at large to the U.S. Soviet peace arms reduction talks in Geneva and as a member of the Scowcroft Commission.

We welcome all our witnesses. We want to express our appreciation to them for appearing here today. We will hear from the present Secretaries first, then give Dr. McLucas and Mr. Woolsey an opportunity to give us their views.

If I may say to all the witnesses, while we are focusing on the organization and roles of the military Departments, please feel free to comment on other agencies concerning organization as you see fit.

Gentlemen, you may enter your complete statements in the record. In the interest of time, please summarize your statements. They will appear in their entirety in the record. We will also incorporate any additional material you want to submit for the record.

With that, let us proceed to our hearing. Our first witness will be Hon. John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the Army.

## STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Secretary **Marsh**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As per your suggestion, I will file my statement for the record and proceed to summarize my statement.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today. Naturally, my views are shaped by my past experience, both in the legislative and executive branches of the Government, and particularly when I served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs.

I will not go into the genesis of the current organizational structure of the three Departments, 1947 to 1950, but I will say to you that the questions that have been raised about the role and the functions of the service Secretaries, as you know, are not new.

We accept civilian control as a very basic and fundamental premise. But when you look at the Department of Defense, the magnitude of the Department and its complexity raise some very serious questions about span of control, and whether or not in order to administer that facility you need a staff organization at the defense level or whether you need a line organization such as we currently have in the Department of Defense.

I favor the line function with the interim managers and the Secretaries for the three services, particularly when you look at the size of these agencies.

The Department of the Army, with more than three-quarters of a million people in the Active Force, some 400,000 civilians, and two-thirds of a million reservists in both the Guard and Reserve, as an institution, is larger than General Motors, General Electric, Xerox, Woolworth, Exxon, Goodyear, and RCA all put together. So, you are dealing with a mammoth structure.

I would also point out that the question of civilian or military leadership of the services is not provided in the Constitution. But nearly 200 years of experience has made it a clearly constitutional role to be civilian.

If you look at the corporate trends of the 1960's and 1970's, you see the impact of technology, modern communications, growth, and sheer size. You will also see that the corporate structure has been moving toward a more decentralized type of management in the conglomerate structure instead of moving toward consolidation.

I think that example has certain merits for us to look at from the standpoint of the management of the organization and operation of the Department of Army, as well as the Department of Defense.

Additionally, the introduction of individuals who are brought in from civilian life from time to time as the administration changes does create an infusion of people with unusual backgrounds, unusual skills, and great qualifications who make significant contributions to the services. We have seen many examples of that in the civilian leadership appointed by the President.

I would mention the role of the Under Secretary of the Army, Jim Ambrose. He was assistant vice president of Ford Aerospace and a former troubleshooter for them. He brings 40 years of experience. Bill Gianelli, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, is a highly regarded engineer on the west coast.

To those of you in the Congress who are looking at the Department of Defense, I would say there is great merit in having a Secretary drawn from the civilian sector, appointed by the President, and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. When you look at the scheme of things as they are usually conducted, you will usually find that when the question of accountability occurs—whether it be in weapons systems or program management—very frequently it is the civilian appointees appearing before these committees who must give status of these programs and be responsive to the concerns you might suggest.

In addition to that, having civilians in these particular key posts is a form of surety or guarantor, not just to the public, but also to the Secretary and to the President, as to the operations and management of that Department. Civilians do become privy to many of the military plans and operations and having that type of oversight is, I believe, very helpful.

When, in looking at the Department today, one can see a profound change which has occurred as a result of the tenure of Mr. Weinberger. It occurred in the earliest days of his administration. It revolved principally around the manner in which he organized the Defense Resources Board, frequently called the DRB.

He made the Secretaries of the Departments full members of the DRB and he allowed the Chiefs of Staff of the services to be observers and make comments in the DRB process.

This is the board for defense management. It provides a forum for the presentation of views. It has an enormous impact, both in a direct and indirect way on the service programs.

We now have an opportunity in this forum to advocate an Army view, Navy view, or Air Force view. This has resulted in very significant changes in the Department.

In the Army, we can also see the impact of the Cost Discipline Committee and its assessment of Army programs.

We see the result of Mr. Ambrose's cost discipline efforts in the systems acquisition reports, known as the SAR, whereby the cost growth of our major weapon systems over a 4-year period reflects disciplined management.

Another area that I would bring to the attention of the committee, because you don't hear about it often, is the executive role performed by the three services, particularly by the Army.

The Army relieves the Secretary of Defense and Defense staff from a number of administrative duties in many different ways.

For example, we are the executive agent for the Arlington National Cemetery. We were the executive agent for the Air Florida air crash, the executive agent for the Mount Saint Helens disaster, and we are the executive agent for the 1984 Olympics.

We have the civil works program administered by the Department of the Army and headed by an assistant secretary. It has an unusual interface with the civilian community. Here you find another function which you do not perceive to be defense in its nature, but really is a resource vested in the Department of the Army.

If you were to remove the service secretaries, you would create a vacuum and you would create a need to fulfill that role. It would have to be fulfilled by the staff of the Defense secretariat and you would find it necessary to increase the staff of that agency.

You would also have a lack of management proximity that would occur by virtue of not having the civilian secretaries of the various services, and you would not have the knowledge they gain in the operation of those programs.

The administration of programs requires proximity and I believe this is very important. You will also find the service secretariat can be a Government interface, not just with the other services, but with the other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

I believe the existing program of civilian leadership has served us well. It is progressing in a way that is enormously helpful. It is one that I have great confidence in and I believe it operates with remarkable efficiency.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this chance to appear. I will be responsive to any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Secretary John O. Marsh, Jr., follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. JOHN O. MARSH, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with you the role of the Secretary of the Army.

Naturally, my views are formed by Congressional experience and service in the Executive Branch of Government. Although I have had unique opportunities to observe the office which I now hold from several different vantage points, I would say that the time I served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense was quite helpful.

The basic structure of today's national military establishment was authorized by the National Security Act of 1947. This same Act redesignated the War Department as the Department of the Army and its Secretary, the office I currently hold, as the Secretary of the Army. In 1950 the Defense Reorganization Act provided the statutory basis for the current internal organization of the Army. In general, that legislation followed the normal policy of vesting broad organizational powers in the Secretary of the Army alone rather than in specifying the duties of subordinate officers.

Subsequent to the National Security Act and the Defense Reorganization Act, the Army Secretariat moved into an organizational posture which recognized the complexities of modern warfare and the consequent need for a functional breakout of its management team. During the 1950's, the Assistant Secretary of the Army positions were increased from two to four and were identified by major functions. These were financial management, manpower, logistics, and research and development and materiel. Additionally, the burgeoning legal implications of Army decisions required the Secretary to have the services of a full-time General Counsel.

In the early 1970's, the Army Secretariat subsequently reached its present structure with the legislatively mandated Assistant Secretary for Civil Works and the Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization.

The issue of redundancy and duplication of effort by the three Military Department Secretaries is one that, I guess, will always be with us. It has been addressed a number of times. In December 1960, the Symington Committee recommended the elimination of the Service Secretariats with the Military Departments remaining as separate organic elements within a single department subject to the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. This recommendation was not accepted as it was felt that Service Secretaries were essential parts of the Defense organization.

Later in the 1970's, the Brookings Institution produced a study that concluded, "It seems clear that there is indeed a unique and useful role for Service Secretaries. By enhancing civilian control, making management more efficient through decentralization, serving as a catalyst for departmental innovation, and, acting as his Department's spokesman as well as embodying the public interest in his Department, the Service Secretary can make unique contributions to Department of Defense management." I don't think anything has changed which would reverse that conclusion.

The business of defense management is so complex and so diverse that the Secretary of Defense needs trusted and skilled subordinates to relieve him of the myriad details of day-to-day supervision. The Service Secretary and his staff are in the best position to provide such supervision. In addition, the Service Secretary will have his own ideas to contribute on resource needs and other Service matters. The Service Secretary also is able to relate his Service views between the Military Departments and civilian officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level.

Many questions have been raised about the role of the Service Secretaries, particularly in light of the National Defense Act of 1947 and other ensuing legislation. It has been my view, long before assuming this post, that these positions are essential for a number of reasons.

In a historical sense, the Service Secretaries provide a civilian oversight, and responsibility for the management and direction of the Services. There are no constitutional requirements that the Service Secretaries be civilians. For nearly two centuries it has developed into a post where civilian status is quasi-constitutional. Within the organization of the Department of Defense the Offices of the Service Secretaries have become critical vantage points for civilian oversight and management of departments which themselves are of great size.

The Army, for example, is an enormous institution with over three quarters of a million soldiers, about four hundred thousand civilians and almost two-thirds of a million Guard and Reservists. It is probably the largest single organization in the United States. With more than 1.8 million uniformed and civilian members, the Army has more people than the combined populations of Washington, D.C., Dallas, Texas and Davenport, Iowa. From another perspective, the Total Army has more employees than the following major corporations combined: General Motors, General Electric, Xerox, Woolworth, Exxon, Goodyear Tire and Rubber and RCA. In addition to the need for civilian oversight and management, the span of control argues against further consolidation. In fact it supports decentralized management along the current lines of organization.

In the last two decades in corporate management there has been a trend away from consolidation and toward the conglomerate approach. In the corporate world the various entities of the conglomerate, while enjoying autonomy are nevertheless subject to the control of the chief executive officer. He has the responsibility for the institution as a whole. I am of the view that this type of line organization—as opposed to the staff organization—is the best. It enables us to satisfy the requirement of civilian oversight and it produces more efficient management in my opinion.

I would also like to relate a number of unique aspects of the relationship between the appointive civilian leadership and the military.

First, as Administrations change, the Secretariat system brings to key leadership posts in the Department of the Army and the other Services, individuals with different backgrounds and broad experience resulting in an infusion of new ideas and concepts. These are reflected in policies that are shaped during their tenure. This leadership provides an expertise and perspective that otherwise might not be available to the Uniformed Services.

Second, there is a role of accountability to the Congress for which there is a special responsibility of civilian appointees. Progress reports on weapons systems and Congressional concerns about management of the Department usually find civilian leadership responding to the Legislative Branch.

Third, the placement of civilians in positions of senior leadership of the Armed Services provides a surety or guarantor on the conduct of the military departments. Senior officials who become privy to the military plans and programs, some of which are classified, can vouch for their necessity with assurances to the Congress and the American people, as well as to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The Secretary, Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries are named by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This fact gives added emphasis and responsibility to the role of the Congress vis-a-vis the Department of the Army.

I would say that the current management of the Department of Defense and its subordinate services reflects in a significant way the policies established at the outset of this Administration by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Weinberger indicated his desire that there be an autonomous but accountable relationship with Defense. The Service Secretaries were given a broader authority for the management of their departments, but a clear accountability to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense remained in effect. Some have described this as a decentralization of control, but there was no diminution of authority by the senior leaders of Defense. As a part of this agenda, there were substantial changes made in the organization and operation of the Defense Resource Board (DRB), which in large measure have gone unnoticed. For the Services, the key point was the inclusion of the Service Secretaries as full members of the DRB and including the Service Chiefs as participating observers. For the first time the Service leadership was given the opportunity to make inputs in deliberations that related to military matters in which they had a principal interest.

It must be understood that the DRB is not a voting body and that decision making is still vested in the Deputy and Secretary of Defense. This change in DRB membership, however, has had a broad impact upon Defense-Army relations and how we develop and present the Army program pursuant to defense guidance. The Army now has a forum for advocacy of its program. Prior to Mr. Weinberger's tenure, the DRB did not function in this manner, and the Services were likely to be given only a day to present to the DRB—of which they were not a member—their views. The current DRB process is very thorough and is likely to last for weeks with an exhaustive consideration of service problems set forth in their Program Objective Memorandums.

The Secretary of Defense's policy of allowing greater responsibility for the Department heads has produced results which I believe have contributed to a more effective management of the Department—and substantial cost savings. Several stand out which I would mention as examples:

In the early days of this administration, the civilian leadership of the Department of the Army established the Cost Discipline Committee. This was an exhaustive survey by five individuals outside of Government, but who had extensive backgrounds in Defense management, production and contracting. Their report has been a benchmark for reviewing Department operations. A host of changes which the Committee recommends have been implemented with significant result in efficiency and savings.

The Under Secretary of the Army, James Ambrose, has also assumed significant duties for the oversight of research, development, procurement and production of a broad range of Army weapons systems whose costs run in the billions of dollars. Although the attached chart on cost trends of 12 major systems based on the Selective Acquisition Reports (SAR) is not alone conclusive, nevertheless, the curbing of large cost growth so prevalent in the past, does indicate a welcome trend toward disciplined cost growth. Substantial savings to the Federal Government is the result.

## SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS (SARS)

## CURRENT DOLLARS (M)

PROGRAMS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED FOR ALL FIVE YEARS:

| | DEC 79 | DEC 80 | DEC 81 | DEC 82 | SEP 83 [1] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AH-64 | 5454.3 | 6598.6 | 7380.8 | 7369.9 | 7369.9 |
| AN/TTC-39 | 812.7 | 915.6 | 1029.3 | 1182.5 | 1192.6 |
| BLACKHAWK | 5722.3 | 6580.5 | 7833.5 | 7384.4 | 7384.4 |
| CH-47 MOD | 2082.5 | 2619.9 | 3154.9 | 3282.5 | 3282.5 |
| SGT YORK GUN | 3801.5 | 5109.3 | 4133.6 | 4124.4 | 4159.4 |
| BRADLEY FVS | 7443.8 | 13147.3 | 13399.3 | 11797.4 | 10618.8* |
| HELLFIRE | 986.8 | 1653.4 | 2047.6 | 2231.5 | 2231.9 |
| MLRS | 3818.8 | 4223.4 | 4136.9 | 4197.0 | 4197.0 |
| PATRIOT | 6134.0 | 8323.2 | 10709.2 | 11680.7 | 11680.7 |
| PERSHING II | 1683.9 | 1825.6 | 2812.4 | 2737.6 | 2737.6 |
| STINGER | 1570.4 | 1878.5 | 3795.6 | 3807.8 | 3965.1 |
| M1 TANK | 12525.9 | 18955.2 | 19574.2 | 20379.9 | 20338.1 |
| TOTAL | 52,037 | 71,831 | 80,007 | 80,176 | 79,158 |
| | | (19,794) | (8,176) | (169) | (-1,018) |

*COST REDUCTION DUE TO DELETION OF 25MM AMMUNITION FROM SAR. 25MM AMMUNITION IS NO LONGER SYSTEM SPECIFIC TO BFVS.

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[1] LATEST PROGRAM ACQUISITION COSTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS. DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY PROPOSED FY 85 BUDGET ADJUSTMENTS TO THESE PROGRAMS

Although not generally known, the Army undertakes a wide range of Defense responsibilities as "Executive Agent." This delegation of authority to the Army by Defense relieves the Secretary of Defense of many responsibilities on matters which would impact on his time—and that of his staff—to the detriment of other day-to-day operations. Many examples could be given of Executive Agent assignments. Only a few for which the Army has a special responsibility are cited below. Some are of a long term nature, while others are a single task for a short period of time.

The Army serves as Executive Agent for Arlington National Cemetery.

The Army serves as Executive Agent for the 1984 Olympics.

The Army served as Executive Agent for the recovery efforts involving the Air Florida crash.

The Army served as Executive Agent for the Mount St. Helens disaster.

The Army served as Executive Agent for the Bicentennial of the victory at Yorktown in 1981, the Treaty of Paris Bicentennial in 1983, and the Tricentennial of the German settlement in America.

The Army served as Executive Agent for the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Colorado in 1982.

Additionally, the Army has a very unique role in a quasi-military manner involving the Corps of Engineers. The Civil Works function of the Army is headed by an Assistant Secretary of the Army who has special responsibility for the civil works program for the Corps of Engineers. This program has made many contributions at the Federal, State and local levels, and is one that has a major civilian interface for the accomplishment of its projects. This program alone runs annually in the neighborhood of $2 to $3 billion. It is a program that historically has had close ties with the Congress.

If one wishes to change the Department of Defense organization by eliminating Service Secretaries and their staffs, one must also consider what should move into the vacuum that is created. As I said earlier, the structure of the Service dictates a requirement for a civilian line of management structure which is already in place. If the Service Secretaries were eliminated, the same structure would have to be created with a civilian hierarchy at the Secretary of Defense level. This level of super civilians would still have to consider the complex demands that I currently do for the Army. But they would do this in a fashion remote from the military departments as compared to the almost daily close working relationship I have and enjoy with General Wickham, the Army Chief of Staff. The Secretary of Defense's multi-Service and Agency responsibilities remove his office from the day-to-day policy issues of the individual Services to a point where it can do no more than manage through general Department of Defense-wide policies.

There are a number of other reasons why there is a need for Service Secretaries and Secretariats. I provide for inspections, investigations, audits, and oversight for potential abuses by the military community of their authority. My office can oversee sensitive operational missions that necessitate military confrontations with civilians, for example, in situations of civil disturbances and unrest.

As a Service Secretary, I have the statutory responsibility to man, train, equip and prepare Army forces for those missions directed by the National Command Authority. I know that in my capacity I have the opportunity to become informed regarding the readiness and capabilities of Army forces. An organization or staff which is remote from those elements necessary to protect our national security will not have its fingers on the pulse of unit capability, nor is it likely to be as adequately informed.

The Army is people. The Army depends on people. As one of the late Chiefs of Staff of the Army said, "Unless we run our people programs well, the Army itself will not be well." Despite the increasingly technological nature of the ground forces, the people that make up the Total Army remains the critical element. Making efficient use of these people while simultaneously doing the very best that we can for our people and assuring that we man adequately our planned force on an all-volunteer basis, are challenges which are best addressed by a Service Secretary who is involved on a daily basis with those things that make an Army operational, fit, and effective.

While it may appear to some that the decision making process in the Department of Defense is fraught with dissension, bickering, and backbiting, I can assure you that this could not be farther from the truth. As in any corporate negotiations, things may occasionally get a little heated, but that serves the purpose of "getting everything on the table." Like our adversarial system of justice, the zealous advocacy of competing interests within the Defense establishment may seem inefficient to one on the outside looking in, but it is actually the best way to resolve conflicts.

A final point I would like to make is that if Service Secretaries and their staffs are eliminated it would deny one element in the present structure which I believe to be a considerable source of strength. That element is the role of the Service Secretary as the advocate for the Service—as opposed to an individual at the Secretary of Defense's level who oversees the operation of the Service. Any type of arrangement other than the current structure would result in an individual overseeing the military departments who would become progressively more remote from the military. The military members have traditionally looked to the Service Secretary for leadership and these leaders have traditionally served as the immediate personification of civilian authority and control.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I feel that there is a sound working relationship between the Secretary of Defense and his Service Secretaries, the line managers, and that the organization as established should remain essentially intact.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Secretary Marsh.

Secretary Lehman?

## STATEMENT OF SECRETARY JOHN LEHMAN, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Secretary LEHMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.

I applaud the committee for addressing this issue. It is very timely. I think much good can come of it.

I have a strong personal bias toward judging individual performance rather than organizational structure and I think that it has been a fault of Government over the last 30 years to concentrate too much on organization, charts, and structure rather than improving individual accountability and responsibility.

If that is a philosophy to be followed, then a major contribution of this committee, in this subject area, can be to make such structural changes that remove rather than add obstacles in the organizational structure to allow good men to perform well. That has not always been the case.

So, with that as a background, I would like to comment on the organizational position of the Navy secretariat, the Department of the Navy and the Secretary of the Navy's position itself.

The evolution of how the current military departments came to be what they are today has been well documented by this committee. It is not an easy summary to lay out. It is an accretion of 200 years of legislation and practice, but it has left the military departments and executive positions, such as the Secretary of those military departments, with great inherent management strength.

It is useful to just highlight some of the key legislative items in the United States Code that lay out and reiterate some of the Service Secretary's responsibilities.

In 10 U.S.C. 5011, for instance, the Department of the Navy is separately organized under the Secretary of the Navy, operating under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department of Navy. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

A further insight into the inherent responsibilities and authority of the Service Secretaries of the departments is to be found in other parts of 10 U.S.C. in elaboration of the service chiefs.

For instance, the Chief of Naval Operations is the principal naval adviser to the President and Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of war. The Chief of Naval Operations is the principal naval adviser and naval executive to the Secretary of Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Department of Navy.

The Chief of Naval Operations' coordinating duties are: To coordinate military operations under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, and so on.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, shall exercise supervision over such members and organizations of the Marine Corps and Navy as the Secretary of the Navy determines.

Throughout the United States Code, there is a strong fabric of statutory authority that underpins the ability of the Secretaries of the military departments to carry out the responsibilities laid upon them. They are, of course, the embodiment of the principle of civilian control.

I would like to address myself to two aspects of that civilian control that very frequently get confused.

There have been many in the military in the past and some incumbents now in the job that have approached the issue of civilian control as meaning that there are certain tasks in the Department that are military and certain that are civilian and that the civilians in the Department tend to worry about paper clips and contract policy and the uniformed personnel worry about operations, strategy, and combat readiness.

Such was never the case in the roots of civilian control in the Anglo-American tradition and there is certainly no basis for any such division of labor to be found in current statute.

Civilian control, as the United States Code says with regard to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, and Secretary of the Army, is indivisible.

The Secretary of Defense is held by statute to be as responsible for the soundness of military strategy and readiness and training as he is for the cost of spare parts and good management in its business activity.

There is a second area of confusion in the issue of civilian control. It is a common criticism of the conduct of the Vietnam war, for instance, that there was too much civilian control, too much Washington meddling in the conduct of that war. We are all familiar with pictures of targets being selected in the White House basement and in the Pentagon, but it is important to distinguish between the issue of Washington meddling and the issue of civilian control.

On the one hand, if this committee were to call before them some of the key commanders of the 7th Air Force and of the Army and naval forces in Vietnam and review with them the actual message traffic, particularly at crucial junctures, one would indeed, I am sure, find excessive Washington meddling in micromanagement of tactical detail.

But I submit that you would find about 98 percent of that Washington meddling was from the uniformed military rather than the civilians. In other words, Washington meddling is a separate issue from civilian control.

It can be abused as much by the military bureaucracy as it can by the civilian bureaucracy. By the way, as anyone who has read any books on the civilian war and American Revolution knows, it is certainly not a new phenomenon in American military affairs, although it reached rather absurd proportions in the Vietnam war.

Civilian control is at the root of our system and it is the principle that you, above all, in exercising your authority in this committee should keep in mind in any organizational changes.

The relationship of the Secretaries of the military Departments to the Secretary of Defense again is founded in substantial and longstanding statute. It is clear that the statutory basis of the position of a Service Secretary is as the executive agent of the Secretary of Defense in the Department of Defense.

As the principal executive agent, he is operating for the Secretary of Defense, who, in turn, under 10 U.S.C., is the President's executive agent on military matters.

The National Security Act of 1947 states that each military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

It goes on to say that the authority of the Secretary of Defense over all the military services is complete and indivisible. That is in 10 U.S.C. 133.

The Secretary of Defense is nothing less than the executive agent of the President in carrying out the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. In the debate at the time, that fact was overwhelmingly confirmed.

The same United States Code establishes the Secretaries of the military departments as the principal subordinate managers of the Secretary of Defense through which he exercises his undivided authority over the Defense Department.

Obviously, we know that the actual practice since the Second World War has varied greatly from administration to administration. The management philosophy of Secretaries of Defense in carrying out that policy has differed greatly.

Secretary McNamara very strongly leaned toward a staff versus a line approach to management and turned over considerable executive authority to, first, his own staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and then gradually, with legislative assistance, turned over considerable executive authority not to the military departments, but to semi-independent agencies set up within the Department of Defense like the Defense Supply Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, and so forth.

The trend during the last 30 years has been a broad trend of centralizing functions outside the military departments and somewhere, and it is not always clear where, between the executive power of the Secretary of Defense and the executive power of the Secretary of the military department.

The trend toward centralization and consolidation of these functions over the last 30 years has waxed and waned. After the very substantial movement in that direction in the McNamara years, the trend during the Nixon and Ford years was back toward decentralization. There was much more de facto authority exercised by the Service Secretaries at the time. It was more a matter of management philosophy of the incumbents rather than changing the structure. In fact, the structure as inherited from the previous administration was largely intact. The structure has been almost unbroken for the last 30 years.

Secretary Brown again seemed to lean more toward a staff rather than a line philosophy of management and the OSD staff and independent agencies exercised more executive authority than they had in the prior years.

When Secretary Weinberger came into office, he came in, as he stated in his testimony before this committee, with a very settled philosophy of decentralization gained from his previous experience in the Federal Government and in State government.

He again made very few organizational changes. The structure and, in most cases, the personnel were left largely as inherited.

There was one major structural change which Secretary Marsh has already alluded to and it is an important one.

First, they changed the nature of the Defense Resources Board to make it, in effect, operate as an active board of directors in resource allocation and to add the Secretaries of the military Departments to its membership.

That has been the only major structural change made in the organization of the Department of Defense. But the actual practice has been enormously different. In fact, I think there have been more changes in the last 3 years than in the entire 30 years preceding in terms of the Secretary's management approach.

The Secretary has a strong feeling that an enterprise the size of the Pentagon must be managed with firmer centralized policy and accountability, but much more decentralized execution and he has been as good as his word on that.

The Secretaries of the military departments, in my judgment, have had fully adequate authority to carry out the responsibilities laid upon them.

In the case of the Navy Department, while I can't say that the almost unswerving wisdom of the Navy positions has always carried the day, I cannot think of a single major issue where I, as Secretary of the Navy, have not had a full hearing before the Secretary, himself, before decisions were made.

So, I don't think any of us can complain about the authority that has been given to us to carry out the responsibilities.

Again, that is practice. It is Cap's philosophy and it has really worked.

Jack mentioned certain instances where it proved its success. Let me add a couple of specifics that this committee is very familiar with.

As you know, 3 years ago, we had a very serious problem in our submarine building program. It was one that had been around for a long time. It had its roots in a lot of different areas and it had the attention of virtually every level and every bureau in the Department of Defense.

In fact, I would say that was one of the reasons why it hung around so long. One of Cap's most urgent priorities at the beginning of the administration was to sort out the mess in the submarine building program.

He turned it over to the Secretary of the Navy and gave me very firm steerage orders. As he testified before this committee, he said that he had learned that the things that succeed are the things that you keep in close touch with, and he kept in close touch with me. But he never micromanaged and he and Secretary Carlucci protected the Department of the Navy from the meddling of well-meaning but essentially nonresponsible elements of OSD. I was held strictly accountable for the results and the results were very successful.

Similarly, we, in the Department of the Navy, are very proud of the turnaround in the aircraft procurement program. As you know, Mr. Chairman, for the first time since the Second World War, we have all Navy air programs on firm fixed-price contracts. It is impossible to have a cost overrun in these contracts.

We now have signed the last of the 1983 contracts, firm fixed price, and we have brought them all in at an average of 9 percent below the budget. This is carrying out a management philosophy of Secretary Weinberger in which he has given the Service Secretaries full authority to carry out policy without micromanagement or meddling from intermediate levels.

I think that the Department is better run today than it has been since 1947 and I think the reason is a major shift toward a decentralized approach which tightens up centralization of policy under the Secretary of Defense and tightens up accountability.

It was sophisticated among so many different levels of bureaucracy in the past that it was difficult to blame anybody or reward anybody for any given event. Cap has made a major turnaround in that approach and I think the successes in all of the military departments are because of that, more than any other reason.

With regard to the chain of command and the role of the Secretaries in the chain of command, as you know, the Secretaries were removed from the chain of command in the fifties and I think that the current setup is good.

I think the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs ought to stay out of the chain of command. It provides the luxury of being able to concentrate, in the case of the CNC, the Commandant, and the Secretary of the Navy all of our attention on the training, the management, the good order, the strategy, and so forth, without having to devote time to following the day-to-day, hour-to-hour events in areas all over the world.

This is not to say, as I pointed out earlier, that there is a division of labor between uniformed military and civilians. It is only to say that the day-to-day operations are not the proper purview of the Secretary of the military department nor of the Chief of Staff of that service.

So, I think the current arrangement is a good one. The Service Secretaries act as senior civilian counselors to the Secretary on operational matters. We are not in the line, we are in the staff as advisers to the Secretary on operational matters.

That is a good system and it varies a great deal according to the management approach and the individual holding the office. I would recommend any changes to the organization that allow the Secretary to operate according to how he feels best served.

In conclusion, let me summarize what I would see as some productive directions.

First of all, I think that Secretary Weinberger's approach, changing the direction toward decentralization, turning more de facto authority and practice to the accountable executive agents which are the Service Secretaries, is by far the best approach for managing an enterprise as large as the Defense Department.

It has worked and that is the direction that it should be expanded and continued.

I believe that there are functions that were unwisely taken out of the military departments and out of that line authority and accountability and consolidated into independent agencies that are essentially out of the line. Yet, these agencies are charged with very key line management responsibilities.

I would think that there are real opportunities to improve efficiency by decentralizing those functions and putting them back in the line management of the department through decentralization.

I might say in this regard that every one of these changes has been done in the name of reform. You followed the example of the 4-cent diode that we paid $110 for.

That was because there are six or seven bureaus within the Department of the Navy, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and independent agencies, each of which has a piece of buying that 4-cent diode. Each one of them followed the regulations strictly and each did what they were supposed to do. But it is so dispersed that no one could be held accountable for the whole procedure.

We are unfortunately buying a great deal of defense material through what the Defense Inspector General called "this clericalized process" as if there is some mathematical element of intelligence. That just does not happen.

What Cap did do was return defense management to the path of commonsense. He stopped the steady trend which is such an easy alternative, particularly here in the legislature, to address a new bureaucratic solution to every problem that comes up.

This year, we saw the creation of a new layer of testing bureaucracy outside of line management in the Pentagon. Never, it seems, is reform equated to getting rid of the buildup of bureaucratic entities outside of the line management that have been added over the decades. All the reforms have entailed consolidating and creating new additions to the layer cake of entities in defense management. I think that this is an absolutely wrong approach to defense management problems.

Yet, I see the trend continuing as strongly as it has ever been up here on the Hill, as strongly as it has been for the last 30 years, and it is the wrong direction to go.

With regard to the JCS reorganization, I essentially believe that measures, which for other reasons may seem attractive, such as adding the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to membership in the National Security Council as a coequal with the Secretary of Defense, and other measures which would add the Chairman to the chain of command, are counterproductive.

I think they dilute and diminish the authority of the Secretary of Defense and go in the wrong direction by adding more boxes to be checked on every piece of paper in the Pentagon, and add nothing to the simplicity of authority.

So, I believe that the current chain of command is the right one, going directly from the Secretary of Defense to the CINC in the field through the JCS. It ought not to be changed.

Basically, other than the long-term trend to try to undo some of the ill-advised centralization and consolidation which may indeed require legislation, I would not recommend any changes to the existing organization other than to think out the layers of bureaucracy so that more of the senior officials can be held accountable to the Congress and to the Secretary of Defense and the President rather than being buried under so many different entities that authority and accountability are lost.

That is a summary of my statement, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary John Lehman follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN LEHMAN, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before your committee this afternoon to discuss the structure of our defense organization.

### ORGANIZATION VERSUS INDIVIDUAL

My first observation is that too much attention is paid in government to organizational structure rather than individual performance. It is overwhelmingly more important that talented, experienced and dedicated men and women be put in charge of our defense effort, given appropriate authority to get on with it, and then held to stern measures of accountability, than it is to seek improvement through organizational and structural changes. It is my strong belief that good men can make any reasonable structure do the job, but that the most excellent and enlightened design of organizational structure cannot compensate for mediocrity of performance. The ideal structure is that which provides the fewest obstacles for good men to perform well. Organization need only provide patterns of order, stability and predictability.

The inquiry of your committee can make a major contribution if it helps to bring about those changes in organization and structure that eliminate rather than add to existing obstacles to individual authority and accountability of senior defense officials.

### THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AND THE NAVY SECRETARY

The Department of the Navy and the Secretary of the Navy have existed for some two centuries and their existing structure and powers cannot be understood without an awareness of the development and evolution of each during those two hundred years. Most relevant to the attention of your current investigation is the history from World War II until the present day. I have included as an addendum a brief summary of the developments of the past 40 years with regard to Defense and Navy organization and powers. I include here the most relevant provisions contained in the United States Code:

### 10 U.S.C. SEC. 5011 COMPOSITION

The Department of the Navy is separately organized under the Secretary of the Navy. It operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. It is composed of the executive part of the Department of the Navy; the Headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces, including naval aviation, of the United States Navy and of the United States Marine Corps, and the reserve components of those operating forces; and all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. It includes the United States Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy.

### 10 U.S.C. SEC. 5031 SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: RESPONSIBILITIES

(a) There is a Secretary of the Navy, who is the head of the Department of the Navy. He shall administer the Department of the Navy under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department. After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

(b) The Secretary of the Navy shall execute such orders as he receives from the President relative to—

(1) the procurement of naval stores and material;

(2) the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of naval vessels; and

(3) all matters connected with the Department of the Navy.

(c) The Secretary of the Navy has custody and charge of all books, records, and other property of the Department.

(d) The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title. The authority of the Secretary under the preceding sentence is in addition to the authority of the Secretary under section 6011 of this title.

### 10 U.S.C. SEC. 5081 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS: APPOINTMENT; TERM OF OFFICE; POWERS; DUTIES

(a) There is a Chief of Naval Operations, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at the pleasure of the President, for a term of four years, from officers on the active duty list in the line of the Navy, eligible to command at sea and not below the grade of rear admiral. In the time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress after December 31, 1968, he may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

(b) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank of admiral. He takes precedence above all other officers of the naval service, except an officer of the naval service who is serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(c) Under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations shall exercise supervision over such of the members and organizations of the Navy and the Marine Corps as the Secretary of the Navy determines. Such supervision shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the full operational command vested in unified or specified combatant commanders under section 124 of this title.

(d) The Chief of Naval Operations is the principal naval adviser to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of war, and the principal naval adviser and naval executive to the Secretary on the conduct of the activities of the Department of the Navy.

### 10 U.S.C. SEC. 5082 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS: COORDINATING DUTIES

(a) To coordinate military operations and their support effectively, the Chief of Naval Operations, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, shall—

(1) determine the personnel and the material requirements of the operating forces, including the order in which ships, aircraft, surface craft, weapons, and facilities are to be constructed, maintained, altered, repaired, and overhauled; and

(2) coordinate and direct the efforts of the bureaus and offices of the executive part of the Department of the Navy as may be necessary to make available and distribute, when and where needed, the personnel and material required.

(b) As used in this section, "operating forces" means the several fleets, seagoing forces, sea-frontier forces, district forces, and such of the shore establishment of the Navy and other forces and activities as may be assigned thereto by the President or the Secretary of the Navy.

### 10 U.S.C. SEC. 5201 COMMANDANT

(a) There is a Commandant of the Marine Corps . . .

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(d) Under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall exercise supervision over such of the members and organizations of the Marine Corps and Navy as the Secretary of the Navy determines. Such supervision shall be exercised in a manner consistent with the full operational command vested in unified or specified combatant commanders . . .

### THE CONCEPT OF CIVILIAN CONTROL

The position of Secretary of Defense and the subordinate position of Secretary of the Navy are the embodiment of the concept of civilian control of the military which is a fundamental principle of the American Constitution. The exercise of this deeply rooted principle is shared equally between Executive Branch responsibilities to administer the armed forces, issuing from the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief, and congressional prerogatives to raise and maintain armed forces and to declare war.

The roots of the principle are found in the historic Anglo-American aversion to standing military establishments on the one hand, and on the other the precept of political authority, e.g., that ultimate authority must be exercised by those responsible to the source of political power which in a constitutional democracy is the electorate. Inherently, professional uniformed military are excluded from exercising such authority.

A fundamental element of the principle of civilian control is its indivisibility. Contrary to the notions of some commentators, defense cannot be divided into a "civilian sphere" and a "military sphere." Hence secretaries of the military departments have historically functioned, and been seen to be functioning, as the heads of their services in every respect. The Secretary of the Navy, for example, can speak for the entire Department of the Navy as well as for its individual components. Similarly, since the creation of the Office of Secretary of Defense in 1947, the Secretary of Defense speaks for all military services, as well as for any other component of the Department of Defense.

The failure to understand the principle of indivisibility of civilian control has lead to many confusions:

(1) Confusion of civilian control with civilian (civil service) functions. Some commentators have recommended, and in fact some incumbents have actually practiced, a division of labor whereby civilians do administrative and management functions, while uniformed military do strategy planning and operations. No such division was intended by the Constitution nor is it to be found in existing law. The Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries must worry as much about the soundness of military strategy, military operations, military weapons and military leadership as they do about the soundness of contract procedures and spare parts procurement. (This means that excluded from the exercise of Constitutional civilian control are those in the civil service hierarchy. We must not confuse the Constitutionally-rooted civilian control of the military with civil service control of the military. The latter should never be tolerated.)

Meaningful exercise of civilian control is not merely "rubber stamping" of the recommendations of military subordinates, but must encompass a deep and thoroughgoing participation in initiation and planning to embrace continuous oversight and direction in pursuit of broad policy objectives. This oversight and deep participation absolutely does not mean micromanagement or centralization of execution. It most definitely should exclude "meddling" into the detailed execution of daily operations and activity.

(2) Confusion of civilian control with tactical command. During the Vietnam War, there was a tremendous sense of frustration among military commanders on the scene because they lacked independence. More than any war in history, Vietnam was characterized by "meddling" from Washington. We are all familiar with the pictures and accounts of daily targets being selected in the White House and the Pentagon rather than by commanders on scene. One need only reread any history of the Civil War to be reminded that this is no new phenomenon in American military affairs, but in Vietnam it reached absurd proportions. What is

not widely understood, however, is that there was much more Washington "meddling" by uniformed military officials than there was by civilian officials. Washington "meddling" is an entirely different issue than civilian control of the military.

### THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY IN RELATION TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) Section 202(c)(5)(b)(7), provides that:

"Each military department (the Department of the Navy to include naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps) shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense."

The major beneficial change that the 1947 Act and its amendments brought to Defense was the creation of authority of the Secretary of Defense over all of the military services as complete and indivisible (10 U.S.C. 133). He is nothing less than the executive agent of the President of the United States in the exercise of the latter's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. His authority extends directly from the President to the operating forces. The Secretary of Defense is the keystone in the practical exercise of civilian control.

10 U.S. Code establishes the secretaries of the military departments as the principle subordinate managers of the Secretary of Defense through which he exercises his undivided authority over the Defense Department, and by extension, the ultimate command authority of the President. In the employment of forces, the operational chain of command goes directly from the Secretary of Defense to the field commanders, whose service components are administered through the military departments. Those forces not assigned to the CINCs remain under the control of the Secretary of the respective military department. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in practice are the conduit through which the Secretary of Defense executes operational employment of the forces. In practice the Service Secretaries should be the senior civilian counselors to the Secretary of Defense on all military matters, operational as well as administrative. Neither the Service Chiefs nor the Service Secretaries are in the chain of operational command.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF DELEGATION—LINE VERSUS STAFF MANAGEMENT

While the sum of the statutory changes of the last 40 years has left the powers of the Service Secretaries intact as the principal executive agents of the Secretary of Defense and from him for the President, actual practice has varied considerably from that principle.

The explosive growth of the staff of the Secretary of Defense from the original concept of 50 persons in 1947, has been catalogued adequately before this committee. A fundamental change, however, took place in the functions of that staff under Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Secretary McNamara shifted the principal burden of management responsibility from his executive agents, the Service Secretaries, to his own staff. This was in part simply a preference for a staff-oriented rather than line-oriented management philosophy, and in part a manifestation of the political philosophy of the Kennedy administration which believed in centralizing authority and strengthening Federal Government institutions.

The decade of the '60s saw a substantial shift of development and procurement functions from the military departments to a combination of growing staff offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as Systems Analysis, DDR&E, and Comptroller on the one hand, and a new constellation of semi-independent agencies such as Defense Supply Agency and Defense Logistics Agency, on the other.

The pendulum shifted during the Nixon and Ford administrations back to more decentralized management, but the basic structure inherited from Secretary McNamara remained in place.

Secretary Brown seemed to share a management approach similar to Secretary McNamara and in practice centralized management was the rule.

### DECENTRALIZATION UNDER SECRETARY WEINBERGER

As outlined in his testimony of 28 July 1983, Secretary Weinberger brought to the Pentagon a well-established management philosophy based on "centralized policy formulation and decentralized . . . execution." He has applied this philosophy extremely effectively. While not seeking to dismantle the centralized OSD bureaucracy that had built up since Secretary McNamara's administration, he returned the authority and accountability of the Service Secretaries making them once again in fact as well as in law his executive agents.

In fact, Secretary Weinberger has made very few organizational changes. Of those the most notable and important change is substantially increasing the activity and importance of the Defense Resources Board and adding the Service Secretaries to its membership. Far more important than these changes has been the actual practice of Secretary Weinberger. He does consider the Service Secretaries his principal executive agents and has provided us the day-to-day support and authority necessary to carry out that role. He has moreover held us very strictly accountable for the results of that management responsibility.

It is my considered judgment that as a result of Secretary Weinberger's management approach, the Department of Defense today is managed more efficiently and successfully than it has been since its establishment in 1947.

At times in the past, Service Secretaries could be overruled, micromanaged, and bypassed by essentially unaccountable staff members in the office of the Secretary of Defense. With Secretary Weinberger, the staff function has been returned to its proper order. If an official of the OSD staff disagrees with a Navy policy or program, he makes his case to the SECDEF and it is then raised between the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary of the Navy.

While I cannot say that Navy Department positions have always prevailed against differing positions from various sectors of OSD staff, I can think of no major issue in the last three years where I was not afforded a full and adequate opportunity to make the Department of the Navy's case to the Secretary of Defense.

## MANAGEMENT SUCCESSES

This committee is familiar with two examples of the application of the principle of decentralized management with centralized accountability and centralized policy formulation. I am sure you recall the difficulties in our submarine construction program three years ago. Defective materials, poor workmanship, extensive cost overruns and lengthy schedule delays were an unending problem. That situation had prevailed for some years despite the participation of virtually every level of OSD and the Navy in the management of that program. One of the first management tasks I was given by Secretary Weinberger was to get the problem under control. Secretary Weinberger gave me very helpful advice but did not attempt to second-guess day-to-day policy and decisions with regard to relations with the contractors involved. He and Secretary Carlucci protected me from the meddling of well-meaning, but not responsible elements of the defense bureaucracy. Secretary Weinberger testified before this committee that he has learned that things are done best if the top management checks frequently. He checked frequently with me and I was under no illusions about the importance he placed on solving that problem nor about the policies he wanted implemented. The important thing, however, was that he let me get on with it.

The results, as you well know, speak for themselves. We have delivered all of the submarines in the last two years since we settled the issue, below the budget and nearly all ahead of schedule; For the first time in decades, there are no significant claims by our shipbuilders against the Navy.

Another example is the tremendous success in dramatic reduction of the costs of Navy aircraft procurement programs. Here again the Secretary of Defense set the policy and principles and gave me the implementing authority. The results speak for themselves. Now for the first time in history, all major Navy aircraft production programs are on a firm-fixed price contract basis. There can be no cost overruns on these contracts. Moreover, we have signed nearly all the fiscal 1983 contracts and we have brought all of our aircraft programs in an average of eight percent below the budget.

## CONCLUSIONS

(1) The secretaries of the military departments, as the executive agents of the Secretary of Defense, are the keys to successful management of our defense effort. Only through the Service Secretaries can the Secretary of Defense exercise his undivided authority over the Defense Department and his responsibilities to the ultimate command authority of the President. Only the Service Secretaries have the unity of authority within each of their departments that is based on 200 years of tradition and is established firmly in extensive legislation. It is that breadth of

legislative authority which provides the Service Secretary with his control over assignments, promotions, training and regulations. That power, together with the power of the purse as the service comptroller, provides the two pillars of authority that cannot be duplicated at any other level in the Department of Defense.

(2) The trend begun in the 1960's to consolidate, centralize and bureaucratize essential management functions in Defense has been very damaging to management efficiency. The trend toward centralization shows no signs of abating despite Secretary Weinberger's efforts against it. Unfortunately, the common wisdom in government still equates centralization with improvement. Certainly in an enterprise as large as the Department of Defense, the opposite is true.

In my judgment the inefficiencies brought about by overcentralization prevent commonsense management in so many instances that they cost the American taxpayers on the order of 10 percent premium on their defense budget. The layers of centralized, overlapping bureaucracy led to what the Inspector General of the Defense Department called the "clericalization" of the procurement process. In such an environment the sound common sense of the any dedicated and talented people we have working in OSD and the Services are prevented from operating. As we saw in the much publicized case of the $.04 diode that cost the Government $110, there were so many bureaus that had a hand in the purchase, each of them strictly following their regulations, that commonsense could not be applied to the process.

Yet despite this sad record of over-centralization, the result of 30 successive years of "reforms", the process continues. Just as in the legislation passed earlier this year to create a new testing bureaucracy in the Pentagon, each problem that gains publicity in Defense is met with a legislative proposal not to remove old layers of bureaucracy but to add new ones. That approach is fundamentally wrong.

(3) Any modification to Title 10, especially with respect to the Secretaries of the military departments, must be evaluated carefully for its impact upon the Constitutional principle of civilian control manifested in the unfragmented and indivisible authority of the Secretary of Defense as the principal assistant to the President. Proposals to increase authority or membership rights of the Chairman of the JCS, diluting the authority of the Secretary of Defense, would be extremely unwise.

(4) Existing chain of command. The existing chain of command, while perhaps not ideally satisfying to academic observers and some past encumbents, is functional. It will not, however, compensate for mediocrity. It does provide a framework for excellent men to perform with excellence. I believe it would be most unwise to add any further intermediaries to the unity of command between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the field commanders. Adding back Service Secretaries to the chain, or Service Chiefs, or the Chairman of the JCS would only add a further layer of complication, delay and bureaucracy.

While I am sure had I been Secretary of the Navy in the fifties, I would have opposed strongly the deletion of the Service Secretaries from both the chain of command and the Cabinet, the deletion has provided certain advantages. The fact that the Chief of Naval Operations and the other Service Chiefs and the Secretary of the Navy and other Service Secretaries are not in the chain of command enhances their ability to concentrate on the organization, training, and equipping of the forces. It permits the Service Secretary the time and tools to get to know personally all of the leadership of his Service and to know and understand the strategy, weapons, organizations, traditions and practices that enable the efficient leadership of the Service. Participation in the chain of command requires a major shift of time allocation to following the day-to-day and hour-to-hour events in all important areas of the world. The two functions do not mix well, except at the very top with the President and the Secretary of Defense.

5. Current organization of the Department of Defense. The overall organization of the Department of Defense is sound. Secretary Weinberger has made the most important change in the direction of decentralization and strengthening the Service Secretaries. Again, that strengthening depends much more on practice than on restructuring. In practice the trend should be continued and strengthened to increase the role of the Service Secretaries and return the role of the OSD to its proper staff (not executive) function. As a general principle, organization changes should follow Secretary Weinberger's lead. It is, for instance, quite feasible to return many of the previously consolidated functions, such as the contract audit function, to their proper location within the military departments. On the other hand, it would be feasible to strengthen the ability of OSD

staff to arbitrate and mediate cross Service and Joint policy programs. In my experience there has been very little duplication of effort in the Services, and OSD staff has been helpful in preventing duplication, a function should be continued and strengthened.

The relationship of the Service Secretaries to the JCS could be improved. There is today no formal or informal interaction between the Service Secretaries and the JCS.

In summary, most needed improvements could be done without major reorganization or legislation. They are simply matters of practice. The major exception to this may lie in the future as Secretary Weinberger continues to reverse the trend of consolidation and centralization, as he continues the successful implementation of his "centralized policy formulation and decentralized execution." Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Orr?

## STATEMENT OF HON. VERNE ORR, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Secretary ORR. Mr. Chairman and members, thank you for the opportunity to be here. I will be brief.

Mr. Lehman spoke of the importance of people as opposed to organizations. I would like to touch on that for just a moment.

I am impressed with the ease with which the present Chiefs of Staff are working in the Joint Chiefs arena. There has been, to the best of my knowledge, no wiring diagram change, no organizational change in the nearly 3 years I have been here and yet I have never seen a group of people with basically disparate interests work together more closely than the present group.

I think one of the strengths of the Air Force today is the fact that the present Secretary and the Chief of Staff work together in such an easy fashion. I have described it in public addresses more as a partnership than a situation where we have a Secretary and a Chief.

We meet almost every day, frequently for long periods, working out not what is best for blue suits or civilians, but what is best for the United States and what is best for the Air Force. I think our individual interests are completely subordinate.

Secretary Marsh spoke about the growth of decentralization in business. I think we have witnessed a contrary trend in government. I haven't had the Federal experience my colleagues have had, although I had 8 years in State service.

I did watch with interest the fact that when someone is elected from a local district to a State legislature, he or she then decides how many minutes a schoolteacher may teach in the local district or makes it a State law, or decides what a city may have on its beachfront as against what the city may wish.

There is a tendency to centralize. That same thing happens in Federal Government—when someone comes back to the Capitol, they feel they are better able to determine what the level of welfare payment should be than a State could do if it were left to its own.

I think as we have witnessed over the last 30 years, the growth of the corporate body of the Department of Defense is probably in line with the kind of growth we have seen in other elements of Government. I don't think it is unique that more things have been consolidated at the central level.

I think it follows the trend of Government. I would hope that trend is at an end. I think Mr. Weinberger feels that way. I agree with Mr. Lehman that one of the problems that we face and possibly the largest problem we face is simply the great size of the three organizations that each of us manages.

Secretary Marsh has the largest with nearly 1,800,000. Our total personnel is about 1 million. That is a very, very large number in anyone's language. I don't think that problem gets any better to lump all three services in one consolidation, hire the same officers we would hire or the same type of civilians we would hire and then have it managed as a three times bigger organization.

Last, I would say my colleague, Mr. Weinberger, has made some tremendous steps in letting the services have a strong voice in their own affairs and in the Defense Resources Board which, incidentally, is not a voting board. We have never taken a vote in 3 years.

It is the Deputy Secretary of Defense who holds the sole vote, but it gives us ample opportunity to put our voice forward and to have it either seconded or knocked down by others in the Board in a long and sometimes acrimonious, but fruitful, discussion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Verne Orr follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. VERNE ORR, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear here this afternoon and I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you a subject as vital as the structure of the national security organization. In our form of government it is healthy to reevaluate regularly the machinery used to govern and make modifications where necessary. This process is paramount in an organizational complex as varied and expansive as the Defense Department.

When I came to the job of Secretary of the Air Force thirty-three months ago, I brought with me little experience in federal service. While my work in state government had some similarities, I have learned that the federal environment has substantial differences. What has impressed me most during that time has been the facility with which the Air Force senior leaders—military and civilian—work together. For example, on a continuing basis each day I work closely with General Gabriel, the Chief of Staff, on a broad range of Air Force issues, and I have received numerous compliments about how effectively the Air Force civilian and military leaders relate to one another and cooperate.

I think the current definition of a Service Secretary's responsibilities is sufficiently comprehensive and adequately structured. I perform the functions necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness, and effectiveness of the Air Force. In three words, I am responsible through the Secretary of Defense, to the President and Congress, to organize, train, and equip Air Force forces for their role in national defense.

The division of military and civilian responsibilities between planning and directing actual military operations and the process of organizing, training, and equipping for those operations is sound and appropriate. While the Chief helps me accomplish these latter responsibilities, my concerns and those of my staff continue to be focused primarily on the budgetary, logistical, and programmatic aspects of maintaining an effective Air Force. However, the Chief, in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible to Secretary Weinberger and President Reagan, concentrates on the strategic planning to meet the national security objectives, and directs the Air Force to fulfill our global responsibilities.

As the Secretary, I am able to exercise civilian supervision of military departmental programs. As the head of the Department of the Air Force, I have the independence, authority, and understanding of Air Force programs to assure that the Air Force conducts its activities in the public interest. In other words a Service Secretary must maintain a sense of dispassionate commitment to both interests—civilian and military.

As the Secretary, I also perform a coordinating role between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its staff and the Air Force. As principal civilian advisor on Air Force matters to Secretary Weinberger and as the head of the Department of the Air Force, I can mediate the interests of both groups. As such, I reflect the breadth of perspective Secretary Weinberger expects from his senior managers at the Under and Assistant Secretary level but, more importantly, I with General Gabriel and the Air Staff, provide him direct access to a high degree of technical, operational, and strategic expertise. The SECDEF depends on the Service Secretary to help formulate broad defense policy and then translate that policy into specific programs.

Recently, we have improved the way in which a Service Secretary carries out his responsibilities. Shortly after the Reagan Administration took office, the Defense Department undertook a study of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Everyone in the Pentagon with an interest in the system participated in the study—each of the Services, the Joint Staff, and OSD. As a result of that study, the Service Secretaries became members of the Defense Resources Board, the DOD "Board of Directors." Now the Service Secretaries have a direct role in developing corporate Defense Department positions. This reinforced the underlying Administration principle of management; centralized direction and decentralized execution.

The principle of civilian control of the military has endured through more than two hundred years of our history without major challenge. The objectives of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 that essentially formulated the DOD and Service structures under which we now operate have been remarkably well achieved. Within the large and intricate Defense organization and its multilayered managerial apparatus my role as Service Secretary is clearly defined. As with any large organization, the importance of a sound working relationship between the princpals is critical to the overall effectiveness of the system. I believe that from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Service Departments, that relationship exists today.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

There are some who contend we ought to abolish the service Secretaries altogether. One of our major allies, the United Kingdom, actually took that step 2 years ago, abolished the three service secretariats and installed in their places two under secretariats, actually called Ministers—Minister of Defense for Procurement, Minister of Defense for Operations.

That system seems to be working pretty well in the United Kingdom. I don't expect you to give a totally objective comment on that, but I would be interested in what comments you might have on it.

Would you like to start, Secretary Lehman, because I think you are familiar with that.

Secretary LEHMAN. It is funny you should ask, Mr. Chairman. I have very strong views on the British organization. I am quite familiar with it.

I think in the long term, it will be a real disaster for Her Majesty's Government, if you look at the way the organization runs. If you think we have procurement problems. Increasing the amount of competition and getting a true, broad range of options for given weapon systems or choices of strategy, their problem is in spades because the leader of each service is now uniformed. No one speaks for that service except the uniform leader in a rigid hierarchical sense.

There are Under Secretaries who, across the Ministry, are treated and viewed by the uniformed services just as we tend to view OMB. They are the ones we have to get through in order to get what we need.

American Secretaries and their staffs of the military departments are very different. They are a part of and are immersed in every part of the management and leadership of the services.

By law and by tradition, the service Chief is the head of the service, and the Secretary is the head of the military department. This is a tremendous source of authority for the Secretary of Defense and for the President.

Service Secretaries have the trust and the confidence of the uniformed service because they know that they are a part of that service. They know the personalities, they know the traditions, they know the strategies and the weapon systems, and can speak for them in policy forums. They are of and part of the mandate of the electorate, which is the key.

They are appointed at the pleasure of the President and confirmed by the Senate. They are the representatives of the political and ultimately elected source of power in the American system. They are also the representatives of the real source of power, the electorate, to the uniformed career service.

You will find that in the United Kingdom, in virtually every instance, that the weapon systems are not nearly as efficiently procured. However, I wouldn't want to single out the United Kingdom because they have simply followed the centralization trend that the rest of Western Europe has followed since World War II.

I would suggest to you that the reasons for the difficulty we have had in maintaining strong military leadership and strong military postures in European Parliaments are many. There are many contributions to it, but the lack of a civilian leadership of military services has been a major contributor.

I think that following the British example, which is simply the largest example of all of the parliamentary governments in postwar Europe, would be a very major mistake for the reasons I have outlined in my testimony.

Chairman Tower. What about the problems of interservice rivalries? I think that is one of the things that drove the British decision. We still have that here. It seems sometimes to be growing unabated.

We also seem to have the problem sometimes when there is to be a special operation, that all the services want to get into the act. As a result, we put together a patchwork of elements of various services without adequate unit integrity so everybody gets a piece of the action.

Secretary Marsh, do you want to comment on that? I have one specific operation in mind.

Secretary Marsh. I suspect that there could be a number. At the outset, I would say, thank heavens our uniformed services do want to get a piece of the action. I think that in itself is very important.

Chairman Tower. Sometimes this may militate against the service best qualified to do the job from doing it.

Secretary Marsh. I recognize that, but the question of the interservice rivalry, in my view, is not as great inside the building as it is perceived sometimes to be outside the building.

I think one of the things that has been helpful in that regard is the very significant change in the Defense Resource Board which does deal in the allocation of resources. Everybody has an opportunity to get their oar in and to speak up.

Now, that allocation of resources tracks the defense guidance and the defense guidance sets out in generalities and in some specifics the role and nature and task of the American Defense Department and consequently who has certain tasks that must be performed.

As the Secretary of Defense has said, as perhaps you have said, sir, the allocation of resources shall not be made on the basis of equity. nor sharing be based on the missions.

I think the question of interservice rivalry between the services is not as great because we have a forum that treats and handles that. The question of the joint operations and interservice rivalries are more likely to occur of military origin as opposed to civilian origin.

The nature of operations today of the modern warfare communications, transportation, logistics, requires that operations must be joint. In fact, you could not have conducted many of those, such as the Grenada operation, had there not been a joint approach to that because of the needs and necessities of the operation.

I don't think doing away with or changing your service Secretaries is going to do away with either the brokerism or rivalry that exists inside the services.

Chairman **Tower**. Obviously, there are instances where you must have joint action in anything of any scope, probably it usually does. The Iranian rescue mission, I think in retrospect, we will all agree was a failure.

Secretary **Lehman**. Exactly, Mr. Chairman, but I believe that is precisely the result of too much consolidation, unification, and jointism. Jointism and unified operations simply for the sake of being joint and letting everybody have a piece are most often the result of a unified command.

That particular exercise was organized at the joint level, the joint staff level. Joint operations are absolutely necessary at the theater level as are joint commands. But as you go further down to more specialized operations, by no means does every little dog have to have a little bit. Yet that is the trend of centralization; there has to be a platoon from this service, a platoon from that service, helicopters from that service.

Unity of authority comes first and most often that is found in one service. It should be the Unified Commander who decides when it is applicable and when it is not. You can't legislate that by organization. The best organization in the world cannot compensate for bad decisions and mediocre men.

I think the problem is that the trend that I have warned against is just as bad in the uniformed bureaucracy as it is in the civilian, that of consolidation and unification rather than decentralization and strengthening of centrality of command and accountability.

Chairman **Tower**. Secretary Orr, do you have any comment on this question?

Secretary **Orr**. Yes; I certainly don't speak without a bias, but I think if you put everyone in the armed services in purple suits, you would have just as much rivalry as you now have between those who go to sea on surface ships, those who go to sea in submarines and those in bombers, those in fighter planes, and those in artillery.

It is a function of their need to have more of what they see as their particular bailiwick.

As for rivalry, the greatest rivalry we have, Mr. Chairman, is in the Defense Resources Board where we all have an opportunity to shout and scream. I am not an advocate of a 600-ship Navy. I make it very plain to everyone.

In spite of that, we get a 600-ship Navy. That is the Deputy Secretary of Defense's prerogative, and he has to try to get 6 quarts into a 4-quart bottle.

Secretary LEHMAN. If I could just elaborate on the DRB. I am not going to pick up the other matter, by the way.

Chairman TOWER. Let us not let this cat get too far out of the bag.

Secretary LEHMAN. I think you will agree in the last 3 years there has been less behind-the-scenes undermining of other services' programs than has been the case in days gone by.

I would challenge anyone here to show me a behind-the-scenes paper from the Navy that undercut the MX or the B-1 and I have never found any Army or Air Force activities undermining the 600-ship Navy or 15 aircraft carriers.

One of the reasons has been that the DRB forces everybody to sit through the presentations of the other services, their strategy, their difficulties, their shortages, and their missions. As a result, there is a much greater understanding on the part of all the services, service Chiefs, and Secretaries than there has ever been before.

Chairman TOWER. My time has expired and I have not gotten to my prepared questions yet.

I sense that a lot of members of this committee feel we should be more role- and mission-oriented and less individual service-oriented. We don't allocate resources just on the basis of equity between and among services. The roles and missions are highly prioritized.

My time is up. Perhaps I can get back to my questions.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Secretary Lehman, one question on your point that you believe that there is too much consolidation in the uniform services.

I understand that to mean—I may be wrong—in Unified Commands there is too much consolidation?

You mentioned some of the examples we have had of more than one service being represented in a particular operation.

Do you feel that is the result of too much consolidation in the uniform area?

What would you change about that? Would you change the law? What is it you are specifically getting at?

I am not talking about DOD. I am talking about the Unified Command.

Secretary LEHMAN. Senator, I would not change the law. I would change the practice. I think the trend has gone too far.

For every problem that comes up, the answer is, well, let us create a Unified Command; let us consolidate a defense agency.

Senator NUNN. Let us not deal with consolidation. I am speaking strictly to the military form.

Where do you think we have too much consolidation in the military command? Do we have it in CINCPAC or in NATO?

Secretary LEHMAN. The warfighting commands have got to be unified, consolidated commands. I am not speaking of that.

I am speaking of the functional operations. To set up a Unified Command to manage resources is——

Senator **Nunn**. I understand the resources argument. That is another argument.

You mentioned the operation of having various branches of service involved in an operation. That is the result of too much consolidation, as I understood, in the Unified Command. That is not a resource management. This is operational.

I am trying to get an example of what you mean by that.

Where is there too much consolidation in the Unified Command?

Secretary **Lehman**. I was responding to the chairman's suggestion that interservice rivalry was the source of joint operations like the Iranian rescue mission. I was pointing out that is not interservice rivalry. It is the concept that every operation has to be joint and that is a broad generality.

I would prefer to avoid speaking or pointing to any specific military operation. It is not a universal truth, but it is treated as such.

A unified joint operation is not always the best route.

Senator **Nunn**. I agree with that. I think we would all agree with that. I think that is what the chairman is saying. It is not always the best route, but the present system seems to guarantee that result.

I was trying to get an example of where we could decentralize and avoid that result, but I am not seeming to get that.

Where could we decentralize there in the field?

Secretary **Lehman**. I tried to duck that question, Senator.

Senator **Nunn**. You succeeded. [Laughter.]

All right, I will move on to a more productive area.

Let me ask each of you, starting with Secretary Orr, what we have before us is a number of proposals on reorganization.

Secretary Marsh directed most of his comments in his prepared statement to the question of whether we were going to abolish the service Secretaries.

Before I get to you, Mr. Secretary, where does that proposal come from?

Secretary **Marsh**. Are you speaking to me?

Senator **Nunn**. Yes.

Secretary **Marsh**. That proposal has been suggested a number of times. I have seen it discussed in print. I think in the 1970's there was some suggestion that that be done.

Senator **Nunn**. Somebody proposed that recently in the set of hearings in the House or in the Senate?

Secretary **Marsh**. It has been discussed from time to time. I think it was a recommendation of the Symington committee in the 1960's.

Chairman **Tower**. I think it is one of those hardy perennials that comes up periodically.

Senator **Nunn**. I had heard the proposal, but I didn't know anyone was talking about it right now as a part of the current legislative effort.

Let me get back to Secretary Orr and I will ask each of you this question.

The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Jones, made a proposal about the Joint Chiefs, how they operate, and made certain changes. We have had many people endorse that and many people disagree with that.

In addition to that, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, "Shy" Meyer, has made proposals similar, but going a bit further.

Would you comment on whether you agree or disagree with the Jones proposal first and the Meyer proposal second?

Secretary ORR. Yes. With both, I disagree. I think I touched on it when I said the present group of Chiefs is getting along beautifully without a change in the wiring diagrams.

I think it is far more a matter of chemistry of individuals than how you put it down on paper. The right people will work successfully regardless of the organization and the wrong people can't work at all no matter how perfect the organization is.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Schlesinger said this morning there was no real strategy emanating from the Joint Chiefs because of the current setup.

I assume you disagree with that?

Secretary ORR. I disagree with that.

Senator NUNN. He was not referring to individuals now, but the institution.

Secretary Lehman, do you agree with either the Meyer proposal or Jones proposal?

Secretary LEHMAN. No. I think they are going in exactly the wrong direction. I have been struck over the years by the criticism of Senator Goldwater, one that I associate myself with, about too much Washington meddling in military operations.

But where I might part company with Senator Goldwater, although we agree in principle, is that I think you are far more likely to get too much Washington meddling in hour-to-hour operations from the military side than you are from the civilian side.

The complaints I heard in 5 years of going back and forth to Vietnam, not to meddle but to listen, were that they had so many layers of intermediate commands and so many phone calls every day at 7th Air Force from the Joint Staff that the poor civilians could not even get through to meddle.

The role of a kind of General Staff in the chain of command would exacerbate that problem tremendously. Every little cat fight would be run out of the General Staff and that would be a disaster.

I think you will find when all the facts are in from Grenada that there is an ideal model of how a military operation should be done.

Civilian and military leadership in the Pentagon carefully review a plan that is created by the CINC's who are then given the authority to go off and execute it, once aproved. No one from Washington, uniform or civilian, meddles in the hour-to-hour conduct. The military is allowed to get on with its business.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, after you left, I mentioned the Grenada situation, particularly since it has been a successful operation from everything we have learned as something I would hope the staff would take a close look at and see what decisions were made and see what the chain of command was, see how the Marines and Army interrelated, to whom they reported, and so forth.

I think if the staff could do that as a part of this study, it would be very helpful.

Chairman TOWER. I think it is a good idea. We will have Admiral McDonald here in the morning.

Senator NUNN. Good. I think it would be good, as we did in the hostage situation, if we could get some of the people at lower levels to tell us how it translated down there.

As one of my general friends used to say, where the folks do the dying and the fighting. I think that is important, too. We have done that in the past. I would like to have the staff interview some of the people when they get back.

I am not talking about interfering with any current situation.

Secretary Marsh, could you answer that question about whether you agree or disagree with the Jones proposal, No. 1, the Meyer proposal, No. 2?

Secretary MARSH. Senator, let me respond to it this way. General Meyer and I talked in reference to the proposal.

I think the operation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in large measure depends on the relationship of the individuals and the management styles of both of them.

I think we are seeing a relationship and a management style under General Vessey that is proving to be very, very effective in the Pentagon building.

I think the Jones proposal and "Shy" Meyer's suggestions have considerable merit. They did cause us to focus attention on the operation and organization of the JCS.

As you know, there is some legislation that has been pending and there are some changes that have already occurred. Quite frankly, I think the manner in which it is operating and functioning now does not require any substantial changes in the organization or operation as it currently exists.

Senator NUNN. So, you would not favor the Jones proposal or the Meyer proposal?

Secretary MARSH. Not to the broad extent or scope as it was originally proposed.

Senator NUNN. Do you favor any legislative changes now?

Secretary MARSH. I think there are some that have occurred. The one that puts the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the chain of command would be helpful.

I do not favor making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a member of the NSC.

Senator NUNN. You would endorse making the head of the Joint Chiefs as part of the chain of command?

Secretary MARSH. I think that has already been done. I think that is the Defense Department's position.

Senator NUNN. That is contrary to what Secretary Lehman says in his statement and I am not talking about the question of whether you think it is right or wrong, but you say the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should not be in the chain of command, do you not?

Secretary LEHMAN. That is right. I think that would be a mistake.

Senator NUNN. A disaster, I think you said.

Secretary LEHMAN. The Jones proposal to make the Joint Staff work for a Chairman who was in the chain of command would be, I think, a disaster.

I would not use that strong a term for the proposal, just to put him in the chain of command.

**Senator NUNN.** How about you, Secretary Orr? Do you think putting the Chairman in the chain of command would be good or bad?

**Secretary ORR.** I suspect I could buy that. I think as an actual matter of fact, and I was not part of the Grenada situation, I do not believe that the Secretary went very far in that operation without full consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

**Senator NUNN.** What I have trouble grasping, and maybe somebody can clarify this, Secretary Lehman, on page 9 of your statement you say, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff in practice are the conduit through which the Secretary of Defense executes operational employment of forces."

It looks to me as the very definition of chain of command. I don't understand the "in practice."

**Secretary LEHMAN.** It is the best setup now because, in effect, the Joint Chiefs own the machinery.

The Secretary of Defense cannot send a message without doing it through the NSC which is owned by the Chiefs. They are de facto in the chain of command, but without the negative aspects of a formal arrangement which would mean that every staff from J-1 to J-5 would have to put in their input before an order could go out.

That is a difference of practice. Today the Chairman is never outside of the decisionmaking process and every order goes right through him and he has a chance to talk about it and so it works.

If it ain't broke, I don't think we should fix it because if we try to fix it, a lot of the bureaucratics that go with it will be brought along.

**Chairman TOWER.** Senator Goldwater?

**Senator GOLDWATER.** I apologize for not having been here with you gentlemen. I had another little argument.

I appreciate what you have said very much. I want to read part of the statement of Verne Orr, page 3:

> The principle of civilian control of the military has endured through more than 200 years of our history without major challenge.

Then the testimony of Dr. McLucas on page 2:

> I view the Service Secretary as a part of that thin but essential layer of people which provides civilian control of the military and which has been a part of our history since the beginning.

Mr. Chairman, I have no questions to ask, but I want to be on record regarding this for anything that might come up in the future.

There is nothing in our Constitution that says the civilian shall be superior to the military. It is something that we have accepted and we have lived with it through all these years.

We have lost the last two wars we have fought, not from the incompetence of the man in uniform, but through the total incompetence of the man in the civilian suit residing in Washington.

Now, let me go back. If you remember history, George Washington complained very bitterly about the control or the attempted control of his armies by the Members of Congress, Members who helped to plan or order tactics to be done; promotions were often made in the field by Members of Congress.

In fact, I think an additional study of history will show that the actions of the Congress nearly lost the war with Great Britain.

Now, that is what bothers me. I do not worry about the civilian, the Secretary, whether he is Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Navy, the Army, or the Air Force.

What bothers me are the civilians who do not know a thing about war, who are attempting to gain control of our military.

Witness the War Powers Act. In my opinion, it is totally unconstitutional. It cripples the President. He is the Commander in Chief under our Constitution and the only person who can order any of us to go to war.

We now have a legislative act which says that within 60 days, the Congress can call those troops back. If I were an enemy of the United States, I would like nothing better than the War Powers Act.

The thing that bothers me, and I want to make this part of the record. is how are we going to overcome the growing desire of our Congress to go to war, end war, and to make tactical and strategic decisions?

When you chase it down, that is what you are going to come to. That is what has been bothering me more and more. I am convinced that we are faced with new concepts of war.

I think we have to think of waging whatever wars we happen to become engaged in in an entirely different manner than we have done in the past.

I agree with the Secretary about the operations in Grenada. I think it was very well handled. I think the low number of casualties will show that.

I keep getting back to this one word. Anything you fellows can come up with that might be of help would sure be a help to my mind, and I think would help our country that this Congress cannot run wars and they cannot go to war and if they don't like war, they don't supply the money. That is what control we should have.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Kennedy?

Senator **Kennedy**. I apologize for not being here earlier, Mr. Secretary.

I wish you could focus for a minute on the question of where responsibility really lies for long-term planning in terms of our military posture.

I don't think there is anyone that questions that Secretaries as well as generals and admirals come and go, but where should the focus be, given the enormous implications in terms of weapon systems, new concepts, and of fighting war?

Who within the Defense Establishment has that responsibility today and how is it being discharged?

Secretary **Marsh**. Senator, I think there are probably several different answers to the question that you asked.

First, there are very broad crosscutting issues in the Department of Defense that must be addressed at the Defense level.

For example, pay is one of them. There are also certain policies that relate to manpower, procurement, and a number of other things. Those are broad defense issues.

A policymaking arm has been vested in Defense now as a part of the Defense Secretariat, but I would say to you, in reference to things that relate to weapon systems and the strategy, that I believe a great deal of your thinking is going to come from two sources.

One source comes from the services as the military officers go through their educational process, which is quite extensive, so much so that the American officer is probably the best educated military officer in the world today. As he goes through the Command and General Staff College and the War College, he will begin to write, begin to propose, and begin to develop concepts and doctrines that today are called the Air-Land Battle 2000.

Second, a lot of thinking, I believe, comes from institutions and organizations outside the Army that devote a great deal of time and effort to thinking.

These ideas are distilled, you might say, at the senior levels of policy in the Army in what we call DCSOPS, in the operation section of the Army that develop plans and policies. They find their way into the Army program and ultimately become part of the Defense guidance.

We really plan on a minimum of 5 years in our services. Our programs are based on 5 years and then they have an outyear plan for the years that extend beyond that.

Consequently, you are driven toward thinking of the future. The continuity in the Department of Defense, in my view, will remain with the rising young officers who are moving up to positions of leadership.

Secretary LEHMAN. There is often a confusion in this town about strategy and what is really meant by that term. There are too many people in the cottage industry of beltway banditry and think tanks, and so forth, that confuse strategy with the actual operations of commanders on the scene.

A lot of people would like to fight the war for our future commanders. We, in the military departments, view it very differently.

In our view, the role of the service Secretaries and the Chiefs is not to dictate where the troops go ashore in a particular amphibious assault or how the forces are concentrated or spread. It is to provide the maximum flexibility, to provide the equipment that our forces are equipped with, the ammunition and weapons necessary to carry out a range of tasks and to insure that we have produced and trained leaders able to make tactical decisions on the scene.

The broad national strategy is set by the President through the National Security Council and, if you will, handed to the Defense Department to implement.

We then, through the Secretary of Defense's DRB and through the policymaking machinery of the JCS, put together broad strategy, theater by theater, after the national commitments have been given to us.

We don't create the national commitments. They are handed to us. We will defend NATO according to the agreements and treaties which are the law of the land.

How to do it, the actual strategy, is the responsibility of the CINC's. It is at that level that real strategy is made and we should not try to dictate it from Washington.

So, there are different levels of strategy which mean very different things.

It was mentioned earlier that Secretary Schlesinger said that this administration has no strategy.

Senator NUNN. That is not what I said. I said he talked about the whole question of strategy and the Joint Chiefs' participation in it. He was talking about expanding several administrations; he did not direct it to this administration nor these Joint Chiefs at all.

That is not what he said at all. That is not what I said.

Secretary LEHMAN. Basically, those are the levels of strategy and each one is created through a different process and in a different set of institutions built at the top around the President.

Senator KENNEDY. I think you referred to where the military fit into that concept and who is expressing the military point of view other than those who go to war colleges and those who have other kinds of ad hoc assignments. Who really has responsibility in terms of that military component to be planning strategy so that it can reflect, once decided upon, the process in terms of procurement of weapons systems, munitions, manpower, and other items.

I would imagine that has to be done first rather than the tail wagging the dog.

Secretary LEHMAN. That is right. That is the way it happens.

In the preparation of the service POM's, the first step is the strategy paper, the Department of the Navy or the Department of the Air Force policy which is derived from the Defense guidance which is, in turn, derived from the national security decision paper.

So, each one is derived from the other and from that paper; each Department puts together the service POM which is the service budget, the decisions of how to allocate the resources based on a strategy, first.

Senator KENNEDY. Can you say that the general strategy now considered within the military is the strategy that was thought about, let us say, 3, 4, or 5 years ago, and if not, how is it different?

Does it rely solely on the political process in terms of the President? How is it different?

Secretary LEHMAN. In the Department of the Navy, the strategy that we have to implement has not changed very much at all. We are given a set of tasks that require us to fashion a strategy. The tasks have not changed. They are to keep open the lines of communication, to move reinforcements to Europe, to prevent the seas from being used as a medium of attack against our shores, and so forth.

That has not changed a great deal. But the larger defense strategy has shifted, shifted to a much more global concern which has been an adaptation to the changing times. We get twice as much oil today by sea from Alaska as we do from the Middle East.

That was not the case 10 years ago. So, national strategy reflects more of a concern to make sure we keep the Alaskan oil flowing and that we don't allow the Aleutians to become Soviet bases directed against the United States, and so forth. But it adapts to the changing national interest.

Senator QUAYLE. Secretary Lehman, you indicated on the question of General Jones' recommendation that it is going in the wrong direction, more centralization, particularly with a strong joint staff.

Do you think there are some things we should be doing, going in the other direction, that could be done or are you content to leave things alone for the time being?

Secretary Orr said, it is not the designs or mosaics or the plans that you can put on the board that accomplish things. It is more people that get things done.

What is your recommendation?

Secretary **Lehman**. I strongly believe that people are by far the most important thing. I don't see as an urgent need, legislation to change the current structure.

However, if the approach that Secretary Weinberger has taken, that of decentralization, is in fact the way we go, structure changes reflecting that approach could result in the clearing away of some of the impediments that have been built up by 30 years of reform and centralization. I could not believe more strongly than I do that that is the path to improved defense management.

Senator **Quayle**. When will that decision be made on decentralization? When will there be any recommendation?

Secretary **Lehman**. I think it is able to be made now. I think the results speak for themselves in all three of the services. The tremendous turnaround in major procurement performance is a good example.

Senator **Quayle**. Will there be recommendations for legislative changes?

Secretary **Lehman**. I would foresee that there could be. I don't think there are any being prepared right now in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but I would not rule that out as Cap continues his decentralization.

Senator **Quayle**. Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn earlier was talking about the staff getting into the Grenada situation. I think it is a good idea.

I also would like to revisit the Iranian hostage mission and also the Mayaguez incident to see how these actual operations developed, particularly from the joint perspective.

I know there is a Holloway report. A lot of work was done on the Iranian situation. I would hope we would not limit this just to Grenada.

As a matter of fact, the question I will ask Secretary Lehman, are there any lessons learned in the Iranian situation from actual employment that enhanced our ability in Grenada?

I am not saying the two are similar. I think there is a feeling that we had this mission out there, whatever the mission is, when it is assigned everybody wants to get into the act. Everybody wants a piece of the action.

If you go back and look at the Iranian situation, Secretary Schlesinger indicated there were some problems with that. He also said there were some political problems in the Iranian situation.

In the military, the joint mission, the unified joint operation, that was not necessarily the case.

Was there a lesson learned from Iran that we used in Grenada to help us out?

Secretary **Lehman**. I think one of the best pieces done was done by this committee, the study immediately after the Iranian rescue mission. I believe it has been published in an unclassified form. That and the Holloway report are the two best things that have been written on lessons learned.

I think the lessons were applied in Grenada very definitely. You will see the contrast.

Senator **Quayle**. Could you give us a couple of those?

Secretary **Lehman**. I would rather not.

Chairman **Tower**. That has not been published, but it is available in the committee files.

Senator **Quayle**. The Holloway report?

Chairman **Tower**. I am talking about the Iranian mission.

Senator **Quayle**. That has not been published?

Chairman **Tower**. No.

Senator **Quayle**. I would think, Mr. Chairman, and I leave it to your judgment, that some of the facts and some of the information in there we ought to publish because it sort of goes to this point.

The question is that when there is joint involvement, sometimes there is joint involvement, there is a little bit of inefficiency, ambiguity in terms of the words that former Secretary Schlesinger used today.

That is why I think we should not relegate ourselves just to studying Grenada.

Chairman **Tower**. May I say, Senator, for that purpose of this study we are engaged in now, we will draw on various experiences that are relevant to the type of issues and problems and questions that we are delving into.

It is not the function of this particular effort to get into the details of those operations.

Secretary **Marsh**. It might help us as far as seeing whether we have the structure that complicates the actual exercise of the operation.

Chairman **Tower**. I understand.

Senator **Quayle**. I guess I really have no other questions. Basically, you are saying, don't do anything. Is that right?

Secretary **Lehman**. That is right.

Senator **Quayle**. That is the message from the Secretaries. We have a unified position.

Secretary **Orr**. I would think no legislation is necessary beyond that already proposed by the administration.

Senator **Marsh**. I agree.

Secretary **Tower**. Senator Bingaman?

Senator **Bingaman**. Let me ask Secretary Marsh if he will comment perhaps and then everybody else who would like to.

One thing I picked up in my few moments here is that some of the items or areas that seem to always be shortchanged—or at least there is a lot of talk about their being shortchanged—are the programs and missions that a particular service has that really are involved in supporting another service.

Examples are aircraft, sealift, these kinds of things where one of the services is required to do, really, to accomplish a mission that the other service more directly has.

Is that something that we can address with structural changes or is that one we have to live with from now on?

Secretary **Marsh**. I think it is probably an area that will have to have additional funding. We are totally dependent on the Air Force and Navy for lift capability. Those items I know do have a priority.

However, its order of priority on their agenda is probably different than the order of priority on the Army agenda. One of the things the Army is doing in this regard is to move toward more light forces. The concept proposed by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Wickham, substantially reduces the number of air sorties we would have to fly.

We are looking at how we can make our forces more deployable in order to minimize the assets that we would require from either of our two sister services. You are identifying a significant Army problem.

Senator **Bingaman**. You don't think it requires a change in the organizational structure of defense to deal with it?

Secretary **Marsh**. No. I think that would take you into the roles and mission area. This would have to be addressed as a resource matter.

Secretary **Orr**. I have read, although I was not here, that there were times when this support was not forthcoming. One time was when the Air Force apparently was not interested in as much support for the forward line of the Army as the Army wished.

I think that is one of the reasons for the great growth in helicopters. That is changed.

The fact is, we have the A–10 and we are working closely with the Army; we are planning at some point to have a follow-on to the A–10.

We had a luncheon at which I invited the Secretary of the Army and his Chief and our Chief. The four of us said we will plan this together. We want a plane that will serve your function and we can live with.

The second thing that is indicative is that in our desire for airlift, the Army has been completely supportive, both for the C–5 and C–17. They have been over here testifying with us. They need those aircraft.

They recognize that and we recognize the big need for the planes to take their equipment. As another example, this morning the CINC's were talking to the DRB. The CINC in the Atlantic believes we should have more AWAC's; he talked about the need for those planes there.

So, there is a great deal more recognition of interservice coordination than there may have been in the past.

Senator **Bingaman**. Did you want to say anything, Secretary Lehman?

Secretary **Lehman**. The main issue for the Navy is the provision of strategic sealift. I think that there have been dramatic changes in the last 3 years in that area.

For instance, more money has been allocated in the Navy budget for strategic sealift in the last 3 years than for the entire 35 years before then.

It is a major change brought about by the decentralized management approach of Secretary Weinberger based on the DRB.

The criticisms that were made of the original Navy program were put out on the table and debated throughout the summer of 1981. A major interservice and OSD strategy lift study was undertaken which everybody agreed to—Army, Navy, Air Force, and OSD—and that has formed the basis of our programing since that time.

There are basically no disagreements in the balance of the program. We need a lot more as we do of everything, but the differences are worked out in the DRB.

Senator **Bingaman**. Let me ask on another subject.

One of the other themes that I constantly hear, and we heard from Dr. Schlesinger this morning, is that there is not enough attention given to the large strategy questions facing us; everybody gets bogged down in the routine and particularly in the budget process, very quickly.

I think that is the case here on Capitol Hill. We immediately jump into the budget process when we start out.

Do you feel that something more could be done in the way of the initial hearings that you have before this committee each year when the budget comes out, to focus more on the strategy issues initially and before we get into the question of how much additional of each of the weapon systems each of the various services needs.

Let me ask if you feel that something could be done to bring us on board as a larger strategy perspective is driving that budget that we are going to be dealing with next year?

Secretary **Marsh**. My own view of that is that when I am using strategic, I am not talking in terms of strategic weapons in a nuclear sense.

I am talking in terms of strategy in the geopolitical sense that envisions the development of sufficiently balanced forces that will meet the strategic demands necessary to support the U.S. foreign policy versus the defense policy.

The first requirement in my view, is to become knowledgeable in this field and that which is going to require some hard work and study.

I would like to see members of this committee give us more of their time to enable us to introduce them to a number of issues that are of significance to the Army and critical for the Army to be able to perform the roles and missions that it has to perform.

I think, second, if the committee would give some time before the hearings for us to conduct briefings of the very nature that you have in mind—that would include both intelligence briefings and operational briefings—we would be more than happy to do that.

I think it would pay vast dividends not only for you, but for us.

The issues you correctly observe always do seem to bog down naturally into questions of dollars and cents. Sometimes the dollars and cents allocations are not made with a rationale that relates to an overall strategy, but I suspect that is the nature of the system.

If you will give us some time, we will try to address that need.

Senator **Bingaman**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Warner?

Senator **Warner**. I think we should try to get to this next panel.

Chairman **Tower**. I would like to do that. I thank you for your forebearance, Senator.

I have some additional questions to submit to the Secretaries for the record if they will be kind enough to respond in writing in a timely fashion.

I want to thank all three of you for coming this afternoon. I think your testimony has been very helpful.

Secretary LEHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Our next panel is Dr. McLucas and Mr. Woolsey.

We have already said something about the background of the two gentlemen who appear now. Both are well known to us and known favorably.

We appreciate your taking your time to appear today. Without further ado, Mr. Woolsey, could you start off.

We will incorporate anything in the record you want to submit. If you care to summarize, you may do so.

## STATEMENT OF R. JAMES WOOLSEY

Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will submit my written statement for the record and talk informally here for a few minutes about one or two points, particularly some of those that came up in the questioning earlier.

I might say I still suffer from a certain disorientation because of what I still call the new horseshoe table here and also from the fact I am sitting here rather than back behind you and Senator Nunn.

I think that there is an important role for the military departments and I say briefly in the first paragraph of my statement why.

I think it is useful for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the secretariat of the military departments to try to allocate their responsibilities a little more explicitly in the direction of the secretariats and the Department, concentrating on programs that are of specific application, primarily within that Department, and the OSD staff focusing more explicitly on programs which are joint or which have strong joint applications and implications and which perhaps involve such matters as important subsystems from a NATO supplier.

I used to be frustrated in the Navy Department when the OSD staff would get into the case of a design of a new Navy destroyer. I would imagine they were sometimes frustrated at my intervention on a program such as JTIDS.

I think to some extent the overlap and rivalry, if you will, between OSD and the service secretariat staffs could be limited by that kind of rough division.

Second, I do think that in the area of force planning, that is, deciding what we are to buy, what is to be developed, we should not be too hard on interservice rivalry.

It does serve in some cases a useful function. Some degree of overlapping in competition is not necessarily unwise. It may be a good thing that we have more than one way to do close air support for the Army, for example, using helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

I call your attention, for example, to sections in the recent best seller, "In Search of Excellence," which talks about research and development policies at Hewlett-Packard, in which there is a great deal of decentralization and a great deal of willingness to accept different parts of the corporation doing research in competition with other parts precisely in order to foster creativity, ingenuity, and solutions.

By the same token, however, I think there is no role for rivalry or logrolling in operations and that many of the criticisms that have been leveled at some joint operations in the past, which appear to be joint for the sake of being joint, are reasonable criticisms.

That is one area in which interservice rivalry should definitely be subordinated—virtually all the time—to the needs of coherent decisionmaking.

Third, I think that the problem of layering and of different tiers within the military departments can, to some extent, be limited by the service secretariats and the uniform service staff—the Navy Secretariat, for example, and OPNAV staff in the Department of the Navy—conducting their reviews of programs together.

We tried to do that when Graham Claytor was Secretary of the Navy in the Carter administration, I think with some success, and I think partly it was because of the appointments at essentially the Deputy Assistant Secretary level by Secretary Claytor. They were people—many of them former or current civil servants with extraordinary technical backgrounds—who were the equivalent of two stars in the military services

What we tried to do was appoint people—and I have used two names here, Gerry Cann and Ev Pyatt who are still at the Navy Department under Secretary Lehman—whose competence was such that the uniform officers in OPNAV would want them as colleagues and would want them to participate in reviews and scrubs of programs that would be conducted jointly for the Secretary and for the service Chief.

I think in many cases that type of approach can help avoid some of the feelings that a poor program manager has about having to face many different layers of review.

Finally, let me say a word, since there were a number of questions about it, about the issues of strategic planning by the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Again, I think it is important to draw a sharp distinction between force planning, namely, how we decide what to buy, and operational planning, namely, how we decide to use what we have.

I believe that in the field of force planning we have only had one institution—really since the beginning of the Department of Defense—that has been both effective and charged with the mission of pulling together a coherent program for the whole Department of Defense, a coherent force plan and budget: the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I believe that has had consequences. Part of those consequences have been seen in the successive triumph of quantitative measures, systems analysis, and the resultant wave of theories that swept OSD in the 1960's.

The Joint Chiefs, to be sure, have a formal role in force planning, but that role has always been a very minor one, however great it was in theory, because of the organization of the Joint Chiefs.

The Joint Chiefs offer extraordinary competent advice and collegial wisdom, in my own judgment, when one deals with them individually or orally. The written product of the Joint Staff, as it goes through flimsy, buff, green, red stripe and all the rest is, to put it mildly, not particularly useful to a coherent military view of force planning for the Department of Defense.

This is the reason that I suport the reforms suggested by General Jones, and I would prefer those to General Meyer's. I believe change is important in this area, unlike the three current Secretaries who have testified. This is precisely because I think we need a coherent unified professional military view, at the senior level, of what the country needs in terms of a longrun strategy and military forces to go with it.

It does not mean that the Secretary of Defense will always have to accept that. I would certainly hope he would not; he would have his own individual view and judgment.

I believe that the Secretary's views, seasoned by such military judgment, has been very lacking over the course of the history of the Department of Defense. It is the main reason why I would favor a stronger role for a reorganized Joint Chiefs.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will close and will be glad to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. R. James Woolsey follows:]

### PREPARED TESTIMONY OF R. JAMES WOOLSEY

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the important subject of the role of the Military Departments in the organization and decisionmaking of the Department of Defense.

I would like to set forth here my brief answers to the six questions which you submitted to me and then to discuss those topics, and whatever others you or the Committee wish, in my oral testimony.

*Question 1.* Is there a need for Military Department Secretaries and Secretariats? What is that need and what is the proper role of the Secretaries and Secretariats?

Answer. Yes, I believe there is a need for the Military Department Secretaries and Secretariats in the Department of Defense. I believe their role should be the principal one in DoD in providing civilian oversight and review for those military programs and budget matters that do not have major implications for the other Military Departments. To offer one example, I believe that civilian review of military recommendations regarding the proper design of a new Navy destroyer should take place primarily within the Navy Department Secretariat. On the other hand, civilian review of the adequacy of Navy and Air Force cooperation on using the strategic bomber force on sea control missions should be reviewed by the civilian staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

*Question 2.* Are the roles and missions of the armed services properly aligned among the Military Departments? What roles and missions should be reassigned?

Answer. Technology has integrated, and continues to integrate, land, sea, and air warfare far more than was the case at the time of the Key West Agreement between the Military Services on roles and missions a third of a century ago. It seems to me that the best way to deal with this continuing evolution is not to undertake an unending series of formal redefinitions of Service roles and missions as technology continues to advance, but rather to work out individual agreements between the Military Services and Departments—guided by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs—in new areas as they come along. For example, in view of the increasing importance of space a new joint operational command, involving primarily the Air Force and the Navy, would seem to be a natural development following the establishment of space commands in each of those Military Services. As these two Services have shown in the field of strategic nuclear programs and strategic targeting, it is frequently easier to work out practical problems in the field (in this case as Omaha) when Air Force and Naval officers sit down together than it would be to make a doctrinal determination in Washington about who has the role and mission in the strategic nuclear field. I might add that, properly managed, a certain degree of redundancy and interservice rivalry is not out of place in the field of roles and missions. Certainly we are lucky today that we have the ballistic missile submarines which, at some times in the past, were regarded as an unnecessary redundancy and an intrusion by the Navy into an Air Force role and mission. It may be the case some time in the future that we will be quite pleased that Air Force strategic systems are able to be relied upon in order to make up for vulnerabilities in Navy systems. It is precisely our inability to predict the future accurately in a necessarily uncertain field such as military strategy and programs that leads me to suggest that some overlap and competition between the Military Services and Departments in the field of roles and missions is far from a bad thing.

***Question 3.*** **Is there unnecessary duplication of effort by the three Military Department Secretariats? By the Military Department Secretariats and OSD? By the Military Department Secretariats and the staffs of the Armed Services Chiefs?**

Answer. If the role of the Military Department Secretariats is concentrated to a significant extent upon programs which have primary application for their own Military Department, then I do not believe there would be unnecessary duplication of effort as between the three Departments. At the present time there is perhaps some unnecessary duplication as between Military Department Secretariats and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This is in part because the Military Departments sometimes become major participants in debates which really have to be resolved by OSD (for example, the proper architecture of a joint command and control system such as JTIDS). On the other hand, it is also because the OSD staff tends to become more involved than is necessary in decisions about, say, a new Navy fighter aircraft or a new Army tank. I feel very strongly that the efforts of the Military Department Secretariats and the staffs of the Armed Services Chiefs should be collegial and joint. In other words, a program should be reviewed by the Military Department Secretariat and the uniformed officers working for the Service Chief in the same meeting. There is no reason to put program managers through an extra tier of reviews at the Military Department level. Civilian scientists and others working for the Service Secretary can make a valuable contribution if the Service Secretary and Service Chief have agreed that their two staffs should work together as a team in reviewing recommendations from lower levels in the Service.

***Question 4.*** **How should decision-making and management responsibilities be divided between OSD and the Military Departments? Does OSD unnecessarily dominate the Military Departments?**

Answer. As described in answer to question 3 above, I believe that as a general policy matter one can distinguish between the proper role of the OSD staff and the staff of the Military Service Secretaries. Certainly if a program has major implications for more than one Service or international repercussions (for example, if there is a major subsystem being supplied by a NATO ally) a role for the OSD staff would be appropriate. I believe that if the Secretary of Defense has a major hand in selecting his Service Secretaries and their immediate subordinates—and is free to appoint people of competence rather than people whose only background is in politcal service to the party in power—he can make such a system as I have described function smoothly. If the Military Department Secretariats, however, lack expertise or come to see themselves as being isolated from the Secretary of Defense and owing only a loose allegiance to him, there will be continued friction between the OSD staff and the Military Department Secretariats. The former will then feel it necessary to intrude into more and more decisions which are best handled at a Military Department level.

*Question 5.* How should decision-making and management responsibilities be divided between the Military Department Secretariat and the staffs of the Armed Services Chiefs? Do the Military Department Secretariats unnecessarily dominate the Armed Services Chiefs?

Answer. A sense of teamwork is only possible between the Military Department Secretariat and the staffs of the Service Chiefs if the uniformed officers who work for the Service Chief are convinced that the civilian appointees in the Military Department have genuine contributions to make to their common endeavor. In other words, the civilian appointees at the Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels should have strong substantive credentials in such fields as military manpower, R&D, and logistics. In many cases I believe it is appropriate to reward outstanding career civil servants with appointments to these levels. In several cases Graham Claytor did this when he was Secretary of the Navy in 1977–79, and I believe that the respect which the military officers held for these civilians contributed greatly to our ability to hold joint reviews of programs and to avoid bureaucratic layering. In other words, Claytor tried to avoid the question of who was dominating whom and to ask substantively skilled civilians and career military officers to work jointly on these problems for him and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant.

*Question 6.* Do the Military Departments exert too much influence on defense decision-making to the detriment of joint efforts? Is the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dominated by the Military Departments and if so, is that domination necessary or efficient? Do the Military Departments dominate the unified commands through the service component headquarters of these commands and if so, is that domination necessary or efficient?

Answer. Joint programs are very difficult to bring off. In part this is because of budgetary gamesmanship between the Military Services and Departments in which each part of the bureaucracy tries to maximize its benefits and minimize its budgetary costs from such joint programs. Hence joint programs sometimes become larded with requirements but have difficulty finding financial sponsors. I believe that the best antidote to this is a strengthened role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff along the lines recommended by former Chairman David Jones. With a strengthened Chairman, who has some influence over the promotion prospects for those who work for him, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs would cease to be as dominated by the Military Services as is now the case. One important component of this strengthened role for the Joint Chiefs is, I believe, a strengthened role in the requirements process for the Unified and Specified Commanders. As long as we have individual Military Services—and I hope that we always do—their important peacetime role in training and equipping military forces will give them an important peacetime influence in the military commands. I believe that the sometimes unfortunate side effects that influence—namely a weakening of the role of Joint Commander in the field—can be counteracted by giving him a much stronger hand in setting military requirements and in determining budget priorities on joint programs (through the Joint Chiefs) than is now the case.

Chairman Tower. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey.

Dr. McLucas?

## STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN L. McLUCAS, PRESIDENT, WORLD SYSTEMS DIVISION, COMSAT

Dr. McLucas. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be here. It is like the old days.

I wondered, since you have 10 living Air Force ex-Secretaries, why I was picked and rather than think it might be because you called up all the others and they couldn't come, I tried to think of some unique characteristic I have. The only one I could come up with is that I think I am the only Secretary that came over for confirmation hearings before this committee together with the new Chief of Staff.

George Brown and I came over together for confirmation hearings. I start from that point.

Senator Warner. Mr. Secretary, don't you also hold the record as having served longer in the Department of Defense than any of the Secretaries in World War II?

Dr. McLucas. Is that a fact?

Senator Warner. Yes.

Dr. McLucas. Senator, I have to take your word for it.

I hasten to say, Mr. Chairman, that although I continue to be an adviser to the Department of Defense and the Air Force, it is not on matters that are under discussion here today, so I don't claim any recent expertise. I left the Pentagon, as you know, in 1975.

I believe that although you have addressed a number of issues, that the one you want us to look at today is the role of the service Secretary and just how important that role is.

Senator Goldwater quoted one sentence from my paper and I think that is the only sentence I will quote, because I like it. I wrote it.

> I view the service Secretary as a part of that thin, but essential, layer of people that provide civilian control of the military and which has been a part of our history since the beginning.

There is obviously much room for interpretation about how much civilian control you want, how thick the layer has to be and in whose hands the ultimate responsibility is, and so forth.

Unless the President is going to do the job, himself, he has to have someone to help him manage, particularly a force of 3 million or more people.

Thinking back to Senator Goldwater's comment again when he said there has been too much civilian interference in the operation of our military forces, I can't help but say "Think what it would be like if we didn't have civilian control."

There are too many countries in the world today where some civilian control would be very much in demand by the people, I believe. It seems to me in looking at the people that I worked with in the military, and I spent a total of 9 years in the building over there, that we had a lot of very, very competent military people.

I thought frequently of the question: What is different about the military and the civilian?

It seemed to me it is not education, it is not brains. It is mostly a question of perspective. It is where you are coming from.

Many times I think the military might have a better education to deal with a given issue than the civilian, but the fact is he is not a civilian and you need that perspective that you get by having lived outside as a civilian throughout your life rather than having lived it in the military service to bring to bear some different judgments on many of the problems that DOD faces.

Although we talk about how the civilians can exercise too much control, I don't think that has been a problem very often with the service Secretaries.

I think the types of controls that we tried to exerise had to do with our management role.

I viewed myself in the Air Force as the senior manager. We had the usual statutory issues to carry out, to deal with, and functions to carry out. I figured that my job was to try to manage, to do the best job I could of managing this whole range of problems.

Also during my time in the Pentagon the military was not necessarily the most popular institution in the country. I felt as a service Secretary I had another role and that was to go out to the American people as frequently as I could, to sit with as many newspaper editorial boards as I could and try to get a better understanding of what the military's needs were and what we were trying to do.

Going on to the management of the details of the Air Force and its problems, I felt that in order to deal with those issues I had to develop the best possible understanding between me and the Chief, between my staff and his staff, and many times we drew on the same staffs.

I think that trend has been accentuated since I left the building. I felt that although we drew on the same fund of information, the Chief and I did not necessarily arrive at the same conclusions because of our different backgrounds, our different perspective, and so on.

Yet it was necessary for us to work very closely together. Fortunately—I mentioned General Brown—he and I had worked together for 4 years before he became Chief and I became Secretary. Our friendship was certainly helpful in finding the best way to work out many of our problems.

Similarly, General Jones who succeeded General Brown was an old friend of mine and we worked well together.

On the one hand I found myself dealing with the Chief and his senior staff and using my own deputies to try to come up with the best solutions to Air Force problems and objectives.

On the other hand, I was dealing with the Secretary of Defense and his staff. It seems to me the first role of the service Secretary is to act as a bridge between those two.

Fortunately, I was in the Pentagon during the time when the relations between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and service Secretaries were good. I know that they varied up and down.

It seemed to me a lot of it depends on whether the Secretary of Defense really wants to have strong Secretaries in the services and whether he wants to rely on their advice.

Sometimes it seems to me we have had Secretaries of Defense who felt, "Well, I know more about this issue than this particular service Secretary does, so why do I need his advice?"

Fortunately, in my case I had no such experience. I believe that the working relationships between the people in the organizational structure are going to be the critical factor. Therefore, I don't see tinkering with the organization as being particularly helpful except in a few specific cases.

Mel Laird was Secretary of Defense during 4 of my 9 years in the building. He was Secretary for a longer period of my service than anyone else. I frequently refer back to that, even though a lot of that time I was Under Secretary, for my experience on how the building ought to be operated.

I felt that what he called a participatory management arrangement worked quite well. Sometimes we made a joke of it: We did the participating and he did the management.

Seriously, I felt it worked quite well and his style of management, it seemed to me, fitted very well the concept of what we had to do.

Let me make my final point and that is the role of the service Secretary in management.

I have already mentioned it. I think some people think the service Secretary's role is to christen ships or to go to airplane rollouts and things like that. Obviously, those things have some ceremonial significance.

Other people say: "Well, you know, we ought to keep the Secretary on the road. If he is a good speechmaker, so much the better. Let him make more speeches."

In addition to those roles, ceremonial, inspirational or testifying on the job, there is a big management job to do. If it weren't done by the service Secretary, if he was not there, you would have to create something similar.

Call him what you like, but he would end up with the same management functions.

Since I talk about management, I have to mention micromanagement. It seems to me in Washington when anything goes wrong, there is a tendency to create a new layer on top of the old layer and to give new people some authority taken away from the ones below them. They are supposed to be smarter and do better.

For a few things, things are working better. Over the 20 or 30 years this number of layers keeps growing and the tendency for micromanagement has expanded from the service Secretary level to the OSD level to the congressional side.

We have a proliferation of staff people asking more and more questions and we are having to hire more people to answer those questions. So, I think the only answer to that is not some change in the organization, but some sort of belt-tightening, whatever it takes.

You have to have a periodic redressing of the balance where the staffs get bigger and the questions get longer at all levels of government.

It seems to me that the service Secretary as a key management person is an essential ingredient and that the quality of what is done in the services and which is done in OSD is going to depend pretty much on how well you have been able to select a management team that can work together well.

Some people say good managers are born. Others say you can get that way, but only slowly. I think you cannot be a good service Secretary without being a good manager at the same time.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.

[The prepared statement of Dr. John L. McLucas follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN L. McLUCAS, PRESIDENT, WORLD SYSTEMS DIVISION, COMSAT

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before your committee today to discuss the organization of the Department of Defense from my perspective as a former Secretary of the Air Force.

The subject of these hearings is of great interest to me although I must say that while I have continued to act as an advisor to DOD and the Air Force on a number of issues, I have not been directly involved in the specific issues being addressed here since leaving the Pentagon in 1975.

My contacts with the military go back a long way. At one time or another I have worn the uniforms of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, having participated in Army ROTC, done active duty in the Navy and served as a member of the Air National Guard.

In my 40 year working career, I spent 24 years in industry or academia, plus 16 in government counting my time in uniform. Twelve were in senior appointive positions, of which nine were in the Pentagon.

I came to Washington in 1962, and served under five Presidents but I still regard myself as an executive from the civil sector who took time off to serve in government.

Although I have not followed all of the hearings which have been held recently by your Committee on the subject of the organization of the Department of Defense, I understand that what I am expected to cover is just what is the role of the Service Secretaries and how important is their role to the proper functioning of the government.

I view the service Secretary as a part of that thin, but essential, layer of people which provides civilian control of the military and which has been a part of our history since the beginning. Although the law has been revised a number of times, nothing has changed the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military. There is much room for debate about specifics, but I assume we are all agreed on the general principle of civilian control.

With respect to the role of civilian leadership in the military departments, I have had many opportunities to think about that subject over the years. It seems me that what we civilians bring is not so much an extra quota of brainpower, but rather a different perspective. As time has gone on, the top military officers have been receiving better and better educations with broad backgrounds in economic, technical and other fields. So I don't think there is much of a case to be made about civilians being better qualified. As an example, we recently had a Chief of Staff with a doctorate in physics, and many, if not most, senior officers have extensive training including many advanced degrees. Many of our top military people have had tremendous communication skills as well, representing their organizations well on the Hill and before the public.

But perspective is something that is acquired only by the hard experience of seeing things through other's eyes or from other vantage points. This, I believe, is one of the most important qualities which civilians can bring to their jobs with the military. I remember my own enlightenment about European views of American actions—an enlightenment which took place during a two-year tour of actually living and working in the European environment. My perspective was permanently changed by that experience.

So I think that unless the military officer can actually adopt the attitude of an outsider—a seeming impossibility—he or she is not likely to understand how a given action or proposal will appear in civilian eyes. Thus, I believe that talk of the non-essentiality of civilian input at the top of the military departments is misplaced.

While I believe strongly in civilian control, I do recognize that such control can be carried too far. Cases of senior civilians participating in targeting in the battle area seem to me to go beyond the normal definition of civilian control. But I doubt if there are many cases where Service Secretaries tried to exert excessive influence in that regard.

As I understood my job as Secretary of the Air Force, I was the senior manager whose responsibility was to recruit, train and equip the force. I also tried to use my office to inspire and educate by example some of the military with whom I came into contact, and I spent a lot of time meeting with newspaper editorial boards and giving speeches concerning the issues facing the Air Force and our need for public understanding. Doing that job involved a multiplicity of functions which required a large number of people to carry out. Many if not most of those people were in uniform. But I felt that it was the responsibility of my office to arrive, through mutual give and take with the military, at appropriate goals, objectives, and methods for accomplishing these functions. This was done through daily meetings with senior and middle level military officials, visits to installations and bases, briefings, etc. I had, of course, a small group of other senior civilians helping me carry out my duties, but in many cases the Chief of Staff and I drew on the same individuals for expert advice. Again, the principal difference, I believe, between my views and those of the Chief were those brought about by our different backgrounds and perspectives. We were assisted in this process by a healthy mutual respect which had been developed over a period of four years of close association before assuming our respective jobs.

General George Brown and I began our tours as Chief and Secretary together. In fact, we appeared together for our confirmation hearings before this Committee a little more than ten years ago. For a year, we worked jointly to arrive at Air Force positions on a host of issues such as procurement, research and development, force structure, training requirements, base closings and the like. When General Brown left to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones was brought in as Chief of Staff and we soon developed a similar good working relationship. We met frequently to develop common positions on a host of issues. Again, we drew on friendship and respect of several years standing and, of course, I was intimately involved in the process of the Chief's selection.

The other half of my job involved interaction with the Secretary of Defense and his staff. It was well accepted that he was the final arbiter on most matters with which we dealt. Thus, it was essential that we maintain frequent and close contact with him and his key assistants.

On putting together our final budget submissions, in justifying our principal system procurements and our research and development, we had to arrive eventually at results we could all support. This process involved numerous face to face meetings and a lot of give and take.

During most of my time in the Pentagon we were fortunate to enjoy good working relationships between the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I served there during the complete terms of Secretaries of Defense Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson and James Schlesinger. I felt it was my job to serve as a bridge between OSD and the Air Force. Lest I give the impression that I served an eight-year term as Air Force Secretary, I spent four and a half years as Under Secretary, and then succeeded Dr. Seamans as Secretary when he left in May of 1973.

Throughout that time, it was apparent that the Secretary of Defense used his extensive direct contacts with the Chairman JCS and the Chiefs of Staff to get their views on the problems he faced, both operational problems and the range of personnel and procurement issues. He also drew heavily on the Service Secretaries on issues within their normal purview. I remember feeling especially gratified when I was leaving the Air Force to become FAA Administrator, that the Secretary of Defense referred to my ability to rise above the sometimes parochial interests of the Air Force to see problems from the perspective of the DOD as a whole.

I felt I served a key role in interpreting the views of the Secretary of Defense to my friends in the Air Force. I also served in the opposite role as translator of Air Force views into words acceptable to the Secretary of Defense.

So on the one hand, I tried to work as a team with the Chief of Staff and his key advisors. On the other, I was a key advisor to the Secretary of Defense and his staff on Air Force matters. Obviously, the other key civilian appointees in my office performed in similar fashion but with reduced scope.

I stated earlier that I thought that in general there were good relations between the civilian and military elements in the Pentagon. But the specific relationships depended to a marked degree on the mutual respect that existed, or at times, failed to exist. Some Secretaries of Defense feel that their own expertise exceeds that of the civilians at the heads of the Services and tend not to seek their advice. This can defeat or minimize the effectiveness of the Service Secretaries. Other Secretaries of Defense arrange to appoint people in whom they have great confidence and thus a useful team spirit can be built.

As an example, during the four years that Melvin Laird served in the Pentagon, he held regular weekly meetings with the Service Secretaries as a group to review issues of concern to all. Similarly, he held weekly meetings with the Secretaries individually to review problems peculiar to a Service. He also used his Deputy Secretary David Packard very efficiently in the management function for which he was especially suited by experience, that is, in planning and procurement of hardware and all the problems that go with those functions. Melvin Laird also had other regular meetings where our views and the military's were sought both separately and in concert. To my way of thinking, his style of management was especially well suited to an organization as complex as the DOD.

As I stated earlier, it is also essential that the Service Secretary and his Chief of Staff establish similarly effective ways of working together. Lack of rapport between them can create morale problems throughout their Service and compromise their ability to respond adequately to the Secretary of Defense.

This brings me to the final point that I think needs stressing and that is the role of the Service Secretary in management. While there exists the ceremonial role of participating in groundbreaking, ship christening, aircraft roll outs, etc.; the public relations role of speaking, writing and meeting with the public; the representation role of appearances on the Hill; and the inspirational or morale enhancement role assigned to the Service Secretaries, it seems to me that their principal role is and ought to be a managerial one.

I noticed that the question of micro-management has been brought up several times in connection with these hearings. When things go wrong at one level in an organization, the usual remedy is to create a new level of structure above the one which made the mistakes, or to move the final decision up one notch on the ladder. Over a period of years, many levels are thus created and each level must be briefed on the subject before decisions are made. This problem applies in the Services, at the OSD level and on the Hill. Everyone is guilty. The only answer is a periodic redressing of the balance, the elimination of too many levels of review, and holding people responsible for managing those things assigned to them. Kicking things up to higher levels is not a substitute for good management. The only answer is getting good managers in key jobs.

The services are charged with recruiting and training functions. These can be effectively or poorly managed. They are charged with buying and maintaining the sophisticated weapons and support systems needed by their forces. Here again, management can be sloppy or efficient. If there is one quality a Service Secretary ought to have—aside from integrity, of course—it is ability as a manager. They say that good managers are either born that way or slowly trained. Whichever is the case in a particular instance, I do not believe one can be a good Secretary and a poor manager at the same time.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I am ready to answer questions.

Senator WARNER. May I ask a question?

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator **Warner**. Gentlemen, it seems to me one other important function that the service Secretary has is the exercise of control of the military and that is the selection of those officers in flag and general rank to proceed on up to the third- and fourth-star level.

You might touch on that and how that is a useful help to management.

Dr. **McLucas**. I will be happy to respond to that. I spent quite a bit of time working that particular issue.

As stated in my testimony, I was involved in the selection of both General Brown and General Jones for their top roles in the Air Force.

But sitting with the promotion boards, analyzing the qualifications of the people that were being brought up, debating with the military the specific qualifications that ought to be the principal ones for promotion was an essential part of our task and I spent quite a bit of time in that role.

Senator **Warner**. Relative to the assignments of those officers?

Dr. **McLucas**. Definitely.

Mr. **Woolsey**. Senator, I spent some time on this issue helping Secretary Claytor and then during a period of time when I was Acting Secretary.

I think there is no greater leverage and no more important function in a lot of ways that a service Secretary has than being able to influence flag officer assignments and also the overall policies for officer promotion through the board precept and board approval. Secretary Claytor went at this problem initially rather slowly because he did not know, nor did I, a number of senior naval officers. I think it is difficult to do it right at the beginning of one's tour in the Pentagon, but if one had been there before or came from being Under Secretary, it is immediately a very valuable and important tool. The major thing that a service Secretary, I think, should do, to be fair, is spend a good deal of time with the senior officers themselves, to see them when they come back from deployments to size them up and make judgments about them.

He has to do it in such a way that he has to pay due deference to the longer acquaintance that the service Chief has, but if he handles himself correctly on that issue, I think he can have a major positive effect on the services' policies and the overall principle of civilian control.

I know Graham Claytor was known for a number of fine things when he was Secretary of the Navy, but one thing he was best known to me for was that he sent the captains' board back four times before he approved it.

That sort of thing sends a rather strong message to the military service, for example, "You don't have enough officers trained in electronic warfare. I said it and I meant it."

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Tower**. Senator Nunn?

Senator **Nunn**. I have just a couple of questions.

I thank both of you for being here. Both of you have had outstanding careers. I have found your testimony to be very helpful.

Mr. Woolsey, you heard the Navy's position on the question of the Joint Chiefs. I understand you are saying you agree with Dave Jones' position.

Mr. Woolsey. Yes, Senator, I do.

Senator Nunn. Does the Navy have deep concern in this area?

You have been Assistant Secretary and know the Navy very well from a civilian point of view.

How do you view the Navy's concern, deep concern, about moving in the direction that former Chief of Staff, Dave Jones, recommended there and opposition to that?

How do you view it and what do you think is valid about their concerns and what do you think is not valid?

Mr. Woolsey. The Navy has historically been skeptical of unifying—the most skeptical service of unifying—moves in the U.S. defense structure.

It was, of course, opposed initially to the creation of the Department of Defense and that is one reason why Secretary Forrestal was picked to be the first Secretary of Defense—as a matter of assurance.

I suppose in part it comes from seasoned judgment on the part of many naval officers over the years that there are such unique features to the problems of war at sea that they may not get an entirely fair hearing in a joint arena, particularly one perhaps dominated, in numbers, by staff officers from the other services.

I think that that judgment has some merit. It is, I think, in many ways difficult for outsiders to understand and appreciate some of the complexities and difficulties that one faces in trying to contend with an environment as hostile as that on or under the sea.

But I believe, in my own judgment, that this need for an overall view of force planning and strategy for the Department of Defense that is influenced by seasoned military judgment takes precedence over that.

I would certainly not want to see an abolition of the military services or even a reduction in the Navy's role in the traditional joint commands in which their officers hold command in the Atlantic and Pacific, that sort of thing, nor would I want to see a reorganized Joint Chiefs get into the details of setting requirements for the next sonar system or the next antisubmarine warfare aircraft, and so on.

I think a system such as that that General Jones has suggested can be designed to meet those perfectly reasonable and understandable objections and still—by giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs some influence over the careers of those who serve under him and their promotion prospects and by giving him more control over the product of the Joint Staff—can give the Joint Staff a charter to do the type of excellent work on strategy and force planning that I think many of our abler military officers are capable of, but which our current system does not permit.

If I could add only one point.

Although I am very supportive of the notion of a stronger Joint Staff, I would still have it be one in which it and its Chairman were part of the chain of command at the sufferance of the Secretary of Defense. That is the current arrangement.

The Joint Chiefs are part of the chain of command. They serve as the staff of the Secretary of Defense for military operations, but they do so through his own regulation and one part of the proposed set of changes to the role of the Joint Chiefs which I am not in favor of is legislation which would put the Chairman, statutorily, in the chain of command between the Secretary of Defense and the unified and specified commands.

It is an important aspect of civilian control for the Secretary of Defense to be able, under law, to deal directly with unified and specified commanders should he so choose.

It would be a rare, rare, rare circumstance in which the Secretary of Defense would find it necessary to do that, but I believe he should have that authority.

Senator NUNN. Could I ask a clarifying question there?

Actually, the Secretary could utilize him in the chain of command if he chooses to. There is nothing proscriptive on that?

Mr. WOOLSEY. In the current circumstance, I may be wrong, I think under the current circumstances the Secretary of Defense is perfectly free to use the Joint Chiefs in the chain of command and by regulation of long standing he does so, but it is his choice and his regulation.

My problem is with legislation that would put the Chairman in the chain of command.

Senator NUNN. You heard Secretary Lehman's testimony when he raised concern about moving in this direction.

He also expressed concern about what he felt was an overcentralization within the military in the unified command, too much feeling that various groups had to come together, and so forth.

Do you have any reaction to that?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I believe that some of the criticisms that have been leveled on the Iranian hostage rescue mission as being an operation that was sort of too joint, are, based on what I know, reasonable criticisms.

I would point out that the very successful operation in Grenada was one that utilized Navy and Marine Corps and Army and Air Force units. That was presumably done at the choice of the local Navy commander.

We have had both successes and lack of successes with joint operations and we have had operations which it has been decided would be joint under the current system and we have also had operations that were not joint under the current system.

So, I think that it is perfectly possible to have a reorganized and strengthened Joint Chiefs under a stronger Chairman which would be free to recommend to the Secretary of Defense operations of a number of different characters.

I don't believe that it necessarily follows at all that a stronger Chairman would always recommend military operations that had to have significant complements from all four services.

Indeed, a stronger Chairman might well feel freer, in the absence of log-rolling that sometimes occurs in the Joint Chiefs under the current system, to recommend operations by only one military component if he felt that was wise.

I would disagree with Secretary Lehman on that point.

Senator NUNN. That is what Secretary Schlesinger said this morning. He said the compulsion for jointness would be lessened if you had a stronger Chairman.

Mr. WOOLSEY. Although I admire Secretary Schlesinger for many things, we did not collaborate on that answer.

Senator NUNN. Secretary McLucas, what is your view on the Jones' proposal or Meyer's proposal or both?

Dr. McLUCAS. Without trying to characterize their proposals, let me say this.

I am in favor of a stronger role for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I think he can get it through several ways.

One certainly is in having a staff supporting him which he can count on and which he feels can be responsive to his needs at the moment.

You can do that by several ways. For example, if you had longer tours of the people who are there so that they would go through promotion cycles and whatnot and their promotion would depend on how well they had done in serving the Chairman.

As to whether there ought to be any change in the law by making him a part of the chain of command, it seems to me by law or otherwise he ought to be a part of the chain of command.

I don't know that there would be any reason why the top man in the chain of command couldn't bypass someone if he thought he was not properly being served by him and talk to the people below.

My concept of command is that the top man can talk to anyone he wants to. He normally will deal with the next man below him, but he certainly won't let him be an impediment to dealing with the next level down.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any other questions.

I want to thank both witnesses for being here today and for their great contribution over the years.

Chairman TOWER. I would like to join Senator Nunn in thanking you both. We do value your judgment and opinions. We think that you have made a valuable contribution to the record.

I apologize for the first panel going on so long. We did not anticipate it would take quite that long and appreciate your waiting patiently.

Thank you again for being here.

Mr. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. McLUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The questions submitted by Members of the Armed Services Committee to be answered for the record follow:]

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER

### SERVICE SECRETARIES AND THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

Chairman TOWER. Secretary Lehman, on page 9 of your statement you urge that the Service Secretaries should be the senior counsellors of the Secretary of Defense on all military matters, operational as well as administrative.

Yet you note that the Service Secretaries are not in the operational chain of command and you indicate later in your statement that they should not be in that chain of command.

Isn't that really saying that the Service Secretary should have authority to formulate operational policy, yet be relieved of the responsibility of carrying out that policy?

And if that is what your are saying, doesn't that violate the principle that responsibility must follow authority?

Secretary LEHMAN. No, Mr. Chairman, my comments do not violate the principle that responsibility must follow authority. I do not advocate Service Secretaries being in the chain of command. The shorter a chain of command, the more effective it is. Service Secretaries should, however, be staff advisors to the Secretary of Defense on strategy and operational policy matters just as officers in command positions must have competent staffs to advise them. The Secretary of Defense is accountable to the President who is ultimately accountable to the electorate. The Service Secretary is accountable to the Secretary who appointed him for the wisdom and quality of his advice and for the manner he supports the operating forces in carrying out the tasks dictated by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The authority for decisions should remain with the present line chain of command: the President, the Secretary of Defense, the unified and specified commanders. The responsibility and accountability for offering advice and counsel to the Secretary of Defense and, as requested, the President, is the solemn duty of Service Secretaries.

### FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY

Chairman **TOWER**. Jim Schlesinger testified this morning that the Service Secretaries have no formal voice in the formulation of military strategy. Do you agree and should there be a change in this area?

#### ARMY

Secretary **MARSH**. The formulation of military strategy is a function best initiated by the uniformed military services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have and carry out this responsibility, and I see no compelling reason to alter the current system which provides for a measure of civilian review by the Service Secretaries. While Secretary Schlesinger is technically correct that the Secretaries of the Military Departments do not have a formal voice in the original formulation of the military strategy, they have the opportunity to present their formal views regarding the recommended military strategy during the development of the Defense Guidance. The Defense Guidance provides the Department's authoritative statement of DOD policy, strategy, force planning, resource planning, and fiscal guidance for program development of all DOD components.

During early September, the Service Secretary forwards his concerns regarding the recommended military strategy to the Secretary of Defense at the beginning of the Defense Guidance planning cycle. Approximately 6 to 8 weeks later, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy publishes a "For Comment" draft of the Defense Guidance. Each Service Secretary again has the opportunity to make his views known in writing regarding the adequacy of the recommended military strategy to the Secretary of Defense. Should any Service Secretary have views which are not in agreement with the recommended military strategy, he has the additional option of raising his concerns to the Defense Resources Board for formal deliberation and decision.

#### NAVY

Secretary **LEHMAN**. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, as the principal civilian advisors to the Secretary of Defense, have a voice in the formulation of military strategy. Specifically, the Service Secretaries approve the strategy and strategic priorities contained in the annual Defense Guidance, which begins with a statement of our strategic goals and priorities from which flows resource allocation guidance to the Services and Defense Agencies for forming budgetary proposals. The strategy contained in the draft Defense Guidance is debated in the Defense Resources Board (DRB) before being presented to Secretary Weinberger and, as has been Secretary Weinberger's practice, the President for final approval. The Service Secretaries should serve as principal advisors to the Secretary of Defense, and I underline the word advisors, in a staff sense, on questions of national strategy formulation and national level operational matters being considered by the President and the members of the National Security Council. No one understands the full range of capabilities and resources of a Service better than its Secretary and uniformed Chief. It falls to both, the former through the Secretarial chain and the latter through the JCS system, to ensure that the Secretary of Defense has the full benefit of their counsel on all matters of strategic policy or importance. The weekly meetings of the Armed Forces Policy Council, presided over by SECDEF, provides a highly effective forum for consideration of combined Secretarial and JCS advice on policy issues. I would also add that the Service Secretary, charged with the formation, training, and resource allocation responsibilities for his Service, must be deeply involved in strategic policy formulation since his objectives derive directly from those strategic goals and concepts. Primarily responsible for ensuring readiness to execute strategy, he is not and cannot be divorced from strategy formulation.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary **ORR**. As the Secretary of the Air Force, I am responsible to the Secretary of Defense, the President and the Congress to organize, train and equip Air Force forces. That responsibility does not include planning and directing actual military operations. The Chief, in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with the unified commanders, concentrates on strategy planning to meet national security objectives and provides direction to the Air Force to fulfill our global responsibilities. I focus primarily on the budgetary, logistics and programmatic aspects, but contribute to the dialogue on strategy at the Defense Resources Board during consideration of the Defense Guidance. In my judgment, this division of responsibility is desirable and changes are not needed in this area.

### ASSISTANT SECRETARY ORGANIZATION

Chairman **TOWER**. Each of you direct a Secretariat staff of several hundred people which to a large extent duplicates the functions performed by both the staff of the military Chief under you and the staff above you in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

For example, each of you has an Assistant Secretary having primary responsibility for personnel matters and the staff of that Assistant Secretary is a major portion of your Secretariat Staff.

Yet at the same time, the Chief of the Service under you has a Deputy Chief for personnel with a staff far larger than that of your Assistant Secretary.

What function does that Assistant Secretary and his staff perform which can't be performed better by the Deputy Chief for personnel and his staff?

And what purpose does that Assistant Secretary and his staff perform which is not performed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense having responsibility for Personnel?

### ARMY

Secretary **MARSH**. With respect to the first question, there are some functions which must be performed at the Secretariat level because action on these must be made at the highest level of adjudication in the Army. This involves the functions of Military Review Boards and Civilian Personnel actions for which I have responsibility and have delegated that responsibility to the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (you should note also that the bulk of personnel in the Office of ASA (MRA) reside in the functional areas concerned with such final adjudications). It is essential to me and consistent with the letter and spirit of the law that civilian oversight over these functions be maintained. Next, I do not think you can isolate on any one or combination of functions that can be better performed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and his staff. The significant difference in functions resides in the essential difference between responsibility for policy formulation and that for program implementation. It seems to me that you have to focus on the overall role the Assistant Secretary and his staff plays. The Assistant Secretary level exercises broad managerial and programmatic control for me over all of the aspects involved in personnel and manpower matters for the Active, Reserve, and Civilian Components. It is the means by which continuous civilian oversight is maintained over program and resource management. The Assistant Secretary provides an independent, less parochial opinion to me on all important issues and assures that department activities are conducted in the public interest. Finally, I believe this office possesses the ability to act as the catalyst for innovations within the Department and that it should be staffed to seize the opportunities to question the status quo and to break with tradition if necessary to realize executive objectives. All or many of these ingredients have been lacking in the historical exercise of staff functions.

As to the second question, I believe that the Assistant Secretary is close to the scene of departmental operations and can focus on those issues and policies that impact on Army personnel matters. On the other hand, the Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for personnel is remote and too far from the scene for them to understand and represent Army viewpoint. At the Defense level, the Assistant Secretary has multi-Service/Agency responsibilities, cannot do adequate justice to Service-unique matters, and cannot pay close attention to the details necessary to manage the personnel program in the Army. Finally, we would have a situation in which the Assistant Secretary of Defense would be working for both the Secretary of Defense and me.

Secretary LEHMAN. Your question is framed incorrectly. The Service Secretaries' staffs do not duplicate the functions performed anywhere else. The staff of the Secretary of the Navy has existed some 200 years and predates the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations by some 170 years and the staff of the Secretary of Defense by more than 180 years. The functions of the civilian Service Secretary staff are in no way duplicated by the functions of the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. On the other hand, the enormous growth in the staffs and agencies of the Department of Defense have inevitably provided some duplication of function within DOD itself and between DOD and various elements of the services.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Services are the critical offices through which civilian control is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretary to the uniformed services.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN(M&RA)) has a very broad scope of responsibility, which dwarfs the scope of hundreds of other Senate confirmed appointees in other agencies. ASN (M&RA) is responsible for policy, program and management functions relating to the administration of over 1.2 million active, reserve and civilian personnel and for budget cognizance over $39 billion.

The following concrete examples of ASN(M&RA) management functions demonstrate the essentiality of this position to maintain effective civilian control, accountability and responsivness.

1. *Broad Policy formulation.*—The following broad policy areas have recently been, or are currently, very dynamic. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has had the lead, but change and implementation would be difficult, if not impossible, without effective ASN(M&RA) interface with the Sea Services in these areas.

(a) Zero tolerance drug program.
(b) Active/reserve mix developments.
(c) Minority accession and career progression.
(d) Women's issues.
(e) Retirement reform.
(f) Force strength development.

2. *Service specific policy formulation.*—The following policy areas have been the particular responsibility of ASN(M&RA). OSD has not, and could not effectively, supervise the formulation of these policies.

(a) Reorganization of the Navy's health care system.
(b) Homeporting of additional ships of the expanded fleet.

3. *Program development.*—ASN(M&RA) participates in the entire program development process as an advocate for manpower (both military and civilian), training and resource requirements for both active and reserve forces. His participation (from political and civilian management perspectives) is essential in order to keep priorities relating to human resources and reserve programs in proper balance when other similarly positioned advocates are promoting other priorities. This occurs during the entire process from initial internal program development through final Conference Committee action on the budget. In the FY84 budget ASN(M&RA) played an active perpsonal role in the following issues: AOCP, C-9, SAM, Physicians Special Pay, ADP Equipment. OSD did not, and could not effectively, manage these Services specific issues.

4. *Adjudicatory functions.*—Statutes and Regulations create nine separate systems of review and oversight boards to ensure fairness and propriety in the operation of the multitude of personnel systems in the Navy Department. The policy guidance and management supervision of these boards are the responsibility of ASN(M&RA) who also holds the statutory delegation of authority to take final action on reviews and appeals.

(a) Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR).
(b) Naval Discharge Review Board.
(c) Naval Complaints Review Board.
(d) Naval Clemency and Parole Board.
(e) Employee Appeals Review Board.
(f) Disability Evaluation System.
(g) Enlisted Administrative Separation Boards.
(h) Officer Administrative Separation Boards.
(i) Navy Board of Decorations and Medals.

In fiscal year 1983 the office of ASN(M&RA) reviewed approximately 37,000 actions taken by these boards and took approximately 2,700 final actions on behalf of the Secretary. OSD can not legally perform this function and could not effectively do so if the law were changed.

5. *Business management function.*—The ASN (M&RA) plays a vital role in the everyday management of program and policies. A multitude of service specific programs need special attention from him which OSD can not effectively provide. The following are a few examples:

(a) Enlisted recruiting and training.

(b) Officer accession and professional development (including NROTC, Naval Academy and professional education).

(c) Promotion and career management.

(d) Horizontal integration of reserve personnel and equipment.

(e) Manpower requiremets determination in the fleet and equipment.

(f) Service-specific dependent concerns.

(g) Training, integration and management.

(h) Implementation of medical reorganization.

(i) MPN account management.

6. *Investigation and response functions.*—ASN (M&RA) investigates and responds to approximately 3,000 inquiries per year regarding a wide variety of complaints, issues, proposals, requests and demands in the manpower and reserve areas. At least 600 of these involve Congressional interests or the interests of other local or national political leaders. Removal of this function to OSD would substantially reduce control, accountability and responsiveness.

It should also be noted that the DON Secretariat has the unique requirement and responsibility for balancing the resources and priorities of the Navy and Marine Corps. Program integration responsibilities exercised at the DON Secretariat level optimize the effectiveness of the Navy-Marine Corps team.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary ORR. First, I believe we need the record straight on numbers. Within the Air Force, some 320 people work in the Office of the Secretary. The majority of these are in two functions, public affairs and legislative liaison. These two activities are not duplicated on the Air Staff. We have them organizationally on my staff as they serve as direct interface between the public or the Congress and the Department of the Air Force, representing the total responsibilities prescribed for the Air Force by law.

Addressing specifically the personnel function, I believe that any duplication is in name only. My manpower and personnel staff is not large, only about 40 people, and most of those are involved in the staffing of personnel decisions over which I have been given statutory discretion and which are not within the statutory prerogatives of the service staff. This statutory authority was vested in the Secretary to avoid any implication of command pressure and to assure due process. In addition, Congress itself established the Board for Correction of Military Records to alleviate the flood of private relief bills which previously had been decided upon in Congress. The remainder of my manpower and personnel staff provides me with a broad policy oversight of the management of Air Force people. The more detailed requirements of that sizable task are worked by the Air Staff.

On a more general note, the concept of civilian leadership of our Armed Forces has weathered well the test of time. I believe that as a civilian member of the President's management team I provide to the Air Force a broad policy and political perspective which meshes with the extensive expertise and experience of the uniformed leadership to effectively chart a course for a strong national defense. In addition, my staff gives me the independent view I need to track all Air Force programs and insure that they are in consonance with Administration policy. My use of staff resources in carrying out my responsibilities is analogous to the arrangement in the Congress. As I understand it, your relatively small personal staff is responsible for providing policy-level insight across the spectrum of your many responsibilities. The more detailed work in structuring our country's laws is accomplished by the professional committee staffs. I believe that the arrangement serves us equally well.

### ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE SERVICES

Chairman **Tower**. Let's discuss roles and missions for a moment. Is there a deliberate effort within your office or elsewhere in DOD to examine from time to time the present assignment of roles and missions to the Services?

#### ARMY

Secretary **Marsh**. The roles and missions of the Services are well defined in law and practice, and I know of no present effort within DOD to make a fundamental re-examination of the assignment of Service roles and missions. Specific Service functions are outlined in detail in the Joint Chiefs' publication entitled "Unified Action Armed Forces". That document is reviewed and updated as required. Certainly the issue of Service roles and missions is frequently considered as part of on-going current actions such as in the regular review and update of our joint contingency plans, but I'm not aware of any deliberate, periodic effort to examine roles and missions on a regular basis; nor do I believe a need exists to do this at the present time.

#### NAVY

Secretary **Lehman**. The specific roles and missions of the Services are explicitly stated in Title 10 of the United States Code. In practice, of course, there is no precise delineation where one role or mission of a Service ends and that of another Service begins. Military operations today depend on the effective integration of all Service efforts. That is not to say that every military action must be a blend of all service participants, but the assignments of functions, roles and missions within and among the Services is a subject of almost daily discussion and review. A review of the actual fleet exercises of the last three years reveals the extent to which cooperation and integration of our military services has proceeded very far along to the great benefit of our overall national security. In short, the current framework of Title 10 provides an effective and sufficient allocation of roles and missions within which common sense may be seen to be operating quite well.

#### AIR FORCE

Secretary **Orr**. There are no formal efforts within DOD to re-examine roles and missions. The guidance contained in previous agreements and policy decisions as reflected in DOD Directive 5100.1, is adequate. However, we recognize the need for continuous refining of the established missions and we are working to improve areas where increased cooperation will enhance our warfighting capability. The Air Force, for example, has made agreements with the Army and the Navy on such issues as the protection of air bases, AirLand Battle doctrine and the enhancement of USAF contribution to maritime operations. Ongoing joint procurement programs, joint doctrine development, and increased emphasis on joint exercises and training will improve our ability to assist each other. We will continue to work for increased joint capability in our assigned mission.

### CIVILIAN ADVOCATE

Chairman **Tower**. Each of you, to one degree or another, has indicated that one of the roles you play within the Defense structure is as a civilian advocate for the Services. Why should each of the Services have an advocate for its point of view—isn't the Chief of Staff capable of advocating the Services' viewpoint?

#### ARMY

Secretary **Marsh**. Military Department programs and policies must be explained to a diversity of audiences and from a variety of perspectives. The uniformed members of the Department are clearly capable of precise analysis of the impact within the Service of Department programs and policies. The Chief of Staff is an articulate spokesman regarding the ability of the U.S. Army to carry out its missions. Nevertheless, no matter how capable our Chief of Staff may be, he is not well suited to portray the ramifications of Department policies and programs upon the country as a whole. It is the Service Secretary, with his civilian assistants, who can detail the impact on the industrial base, the research and development community, and other segments of the civil sector.

Equally as important is the role the Secretary plays as the advocate within the political arena. First, as a member of the Administration, the Secretary insures Department policy is consistent with Administration policy. Looking upward, the Secretary advises the highest levels of the Executive as to how Army policies reinforce and help achieve the President's goals. Similarly, the Secretary is a vital participant in the dialogue with the Congress. Not only does he give account of the management and direction of Service programs, he is an open communication channel to receive and respond to Congressional concerns and considerations. As I said in my opening statement, the absence of a Secretary of the Army would necessitate the creation of such a spokesman, perhaps even in OSD. The further removed from the Army such a spokesman is, the less effective will he be.

### NAVY

Secretary Lehman. The function of the Service Secretary is not simply to act as an advocate for the Service. I have outlined in my testimony the strong roots of the Service Secretary's responsibility and authority in the most fundamental principles of our constitution. Civilian control requires that the head of a military service be a civilian responsible to and appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the President and the Secretary of Defense. He should not owe his allegiance to a military promotion system which by its nature cannot be directly responsible to the electorate. The Service Secretary transmits Presidential policy to the Services, insuring its implementation within a Service whose intricacies and professionalism he knows thoroughly. The corollary of that function is that he speaks with special authority in articulating and at times advocating his Service's perspective within the senior councils of the Administration.

### AIR FORCE

Secreary Orr. Certainly the Chiefs are capable of representing the Services' viewpoint, and within the joint arena they do that very well. The value of the Secretary's advocacy role becomes most evident in the civilian arena. The Service Secretary, appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and confimed by the Senate, serves as a necessary link between the military and the civilian elected and appointed leadership. He offers a different perspective in presenting his Service's viewpoint to OSD and Administration leadership. Additionally, the Secretary's responsibility to organize, train and equip his forces requires that he compete for his Service's share of scarce resources. The civilian Service Secretary, with the assistance of his Service Chief, is the right person to perform this advocacy.

## CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

Chairman Tower. Each of you has indicated that the civilian control role of the Secretary of the military department is an important one. Yet in the area in which civilian control perhaps could be most important, that is operational chain of command, you are excluded. Do you believe the military department Secretary should be in the operational chain of command, and if not, how is sufficient civilian control exercised in that area?

### NAVY

Secretary Lehman. The Service Secretary need not and should not be in the line operational chain of command to the operating forces. Civilian control is properly exercised by the Secretary of Defense and the President. Operational chains of command are most effective when they are short, with no unnecessary layers of command and control. Service Secretaries perform a valuable function as staff—not line—advisors to the Secretary of Defense and, in that capacity, assist in insuring the proper degree of civilian control of the military. They are line, not staff, executives for all functions within their military departments.

### ARMY

Secretary Marsh. I believe that the civilian control role of the Secretary of the military departments is an important one, but we should not confuse that role with the conduct of military operations. I do not believe that Service Secretaries should be in the operational chain of command. Operational command of U.S. forces is exercised by unified and specified commanders in accordance with the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The chain of command for operations runs from the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the operational CINC's. Throughout military operations, effective civilian control is maintained appropriately at the very top—by the President and Secretary of Defense. While they serve as principal advisers to the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries are not in the operational chain of command because military operations are not conducted by the Services per se, but by the Service components of unified and specified commands. Similarly, Service Chiefs are not in the operational chain of command in their role as Service Chiefs. The civilian control role of Service Secretaries is an important one—but one which is exercised in the functional areas relegated to the Services, i.e., organizing, training and equipping Service forces. I believe the present system functions well, as evidenced by the most recent rescue operation in Grenada.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary **Orr**. The AF supports the alignment of responsibilities and organizational arrangement for the military departments as reflected in Title 10 United States Code. The operational chain of command now runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Unified/Specified commanders. The Secretaries of the military departments are outside this chain; yet, they are responsible for the preparation, logistical and administrative support of forces employed by the Unified or Specified commanders. Civilian control in the operational chain is provided by the President and Secretary of Defense, to whom the military department Secretaries are responsible. Because the Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for functions pertaining to training, equipping and sustaining forces, their actions profoundly influence decisions made in the operational chain of command.

We don't think that adding still another layer to the operational chain would improve our warfighting ability. Accordingly, we believe that our forces have sufficient civilian control, and we support the arrangements provided in the statutes.

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## Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond

### DIVISION OF DECISIONMAKING

Senator **Thurmond**. How do you feel that decisionmaking should be divided between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments?

### ARMY

Secretary **Marsh**. The tasks to be accomplished by the Department of Defense are identified and determined by the Secretary of Defense. The members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense assist in the formulation and articulation of the broad departmentwide policy and guidance. As his direct staff, OSD translates the Secretary's decisions into the guidance and implementing documents associated with Secretarial decisions. The OSD staff does not make decisions autonomously, but rather in consonance with Secretarial decisions and policies.

The Military Departments have a clear responsibility to organize, train, and equip their forces in preparation for the conduct of military operations. Obviously, the DOD-wide decisions of the Secretary of Defense have a direct impact on the Military Departments. It is, therefore, proper and desirable for the Military Secretaries to present their advice to the Secretary of Defense prior to his making a decision. As I have indicated, Secretary Weinberger has systematically sought that advice. The most illustrative example of the participatory role of the Military Secretaries in decisionmaking is their inclusion as members of the Defense Resources Board. We are present in this forum along with the staff advisers from the Secretary of Defense's Office.

### NAVY

Secretary **Lehman**. In this administration, unlike that of some in the past 35 years, decisionmaking is decentralized and effectively delegated within the Department of Defense. Decisions of strategy formulation and major resource allocation policy are debated in the forum of the Defense Resources Board with participation by all interested parties—the principal OSD Assistant Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and Directors; the Service Secretaries; Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; and, when advisable, the Service Chiefs and field commanders. Once policy decisions have been made by the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries are given the latitude to make the necessary decisions to implement those policies. It is a functioning line management system that insures proper delegation of authority and accountability at all levels. It is working well now with improved performance and efficiency in every area from personnel to procurement. This was not the case during periods when decision making was centralized within the OSD staff whose accountability did not go hand in hand with authority for decisions taken. The present decisionmaking structure insures maximum effectiveness.

The OSD staff has an essential function to play. It should serve as the Secretary's advisory staff to coordinate cross Service issues, to bring forth from the Services those issues that are worth the Secretary of Defense's attention, and to challenge assumptions within the large Defense bureaucracy.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary **Orr**. The military departments enjoy a civilian-military partnership which provides unique expertise peculiar to each Service. The Secretary of Defense, who has ultimate decisionmaking authority within DOD, takes advantage of this expertise in arriving at planning, programing and budgeting decisions as well as military and operational ones. The Office of the Secretary of Defense supports the Secretary and serves as a mediator for competing concerns of the military departments. The military departments already have and should continue to have a voice in these decisions because they bring to the deliberations a wealth of experience which support their perspectives. The military departments can, and do, provide the military answers and are able to discern the impact of economic decisions on their forces. Detailed military planning must be left to the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, our approach to the decisionmaking process should not be to divide the responsibility between OSD and the military departments because most decisions are at once, fiscal, operational, military and political in nature. Rather, we should keep in mind that OSD and the military departments are in a partnership whose ultimate goal is to arrive at decisions which support our national objectives.

### ALTERING ROLES AND MISSIONS

Senator **Thurmond**. If you could alter roles and missions as they are presently structured, how would you do so?

### ARMY

Secretary **Marsh**. As I've noted earlier, the roles and missions of the Services are well defined in law and practice and I do not see a need to alter these at present.

### NAVY

Secretary **Lehman**. The present Service roles and missions as delineated in Title 10 of the United States Code are well defined and properly allocated to the appropriate military service. I do not advocate changing or altering any of them. They determine the proper structuring of our land, sea, and air forces and have been tested in war and peace. I see no need to change any currently assigned role or mission, primary or collateral, for any of the military services.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary **Orr**. The Air Force supports the alignment of Service functions as currently stated in DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components." Service developed missions are performed to support these functions. Service roles and missions are continuously refined in the light of limited resources, the evolving threat, and the need to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. For example, the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Army recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) initiating a Joint U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Development Process. This is a follow-on to the 21 April 83 MOU on AirLand Battle Doctrine. If adjustments are required through this study, they will be made. The Air Force has also signed an agreement with the Navy which strengthens cooperation between the Services in performing assigned functions and missions.

### SECDEF MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel that the Office of the Secretary of Defense tends to micromanage the military departments?

### ARMY

Secretary MARSH. The management philosophy of the Secretary of Defense is, as I have stated, decentralized. The Military Secretaries are responsible, much as operating officers of companies within a conglomerate, for the operation of their departments. Nonetheless, while we have the broad authority to run our departments, we are still accountable to the Secretary of Defense.

To assist in overseeing the operation of the Defense Department, the OSD staff must gather information and make evaluations. For the most part, that function is accomplished correctly. While this has not been a management philosophy that has always prevailed in the past, Secretary Weinberger has looked to the Military Secretaries for the management of their departments. With that sustained approach, the OSD staff has been checked in the normal and understandable tendency to over-manage. While Secretary Weinberger's management style has not precluded what we in the Services consider OSD staff micro-management, it has sharply curtailed it.

### NAVY

Secretary LEHMAN. Any organization the size of OSD, is bound to attempt to micromanage the subordinate military departments. Such was certainly the case in the McNamara years when most effective decision authority was centralized in OSD. While some of that tendency remains, the OSD staff, at present, has not been granted the degree of authority by the Secretary of Defense to micromanage the Navy Department. I have been granted the authority to manage and regulate the Department of the Navy as I deem appropriate, with direct accountability to Secretary Weinberger. As long as OSD retains its present size and structure, a tendency to micromanage the Service departments will remain.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary ORR. The top levels of OSD have tended to concentrate on large management issues. Micromanagement sometimes occurs at the lower levels of OSD when strong, single issue advocates have influenced guidance toward the microlevel. Such advocacy can disrupt the overall program balance. The increasingly detailed congressional scrutiny of the Services' programs has also contributed to increased micromanagement by OSD.

### DUAL-HATTING SERVICE CHIEFS AS MEMBERS OF JCS

Senator THURMOND. Would you give us your views of the problems caused by Service Chiefs being dual-hatted as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

### ARMY

Secretary MARSH. The opponents of "dual-hatting" have identified two reasons for relieving the Service Chiefs of their JCS responsibilities. First, "dual-hatting" reinforces what is seen as Service parochialism in JCS deliberations. Second, the time required to fulfill JCS duties leaves insufficient time for a Chief to perform his Service role. While ending the practice of "dual-hatting" would certainly alleviate these concerns, on balance, the disadvantages of such a fundamental change far outweigh the advantages.

The Service Chiefs are uniquely able to bring a thorough understanding of the current status of forces and programs to JCS deliberations. Advisors who are less well-informed could easily offer impractical advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President or, at a minimum, make it less timely. What is alleged to be parochialism in the JCS arena is most frequently a realistic perspective by the JCS members on how a JCS proposal might impact their Services. If our defense effort is to be truly joint, then the forces and programs of the Services must harmonize in important ways, a harmony our dual-hatted Chiefs can best effect. Thus, lacking an important element of the responsibility to implement their advice to the Secretary of Defense, the JCS could well provide inadequate counsel to the Secretary.

Regarding the time factor, there is no doubt that joint duties detract from the time available for Service duties. What is in question is whether that is too much—or whether the Chiefs have insufficient opportunity to implement needed Service functions. The past four years shows that General Meyer was able to achieve considerable improvement in the fighting condition of the Army. Improved training and enhanced readiness are his legacy, as well as a significant modernization program. General Wickham, thus far in his short tenure, is advancing a major initiative regarding light infantry forces.

These accomplishments demonstrate that the Service Chief can handle his JCS responsibilities and still provide direction to his Service. He is simultaneously a better Service Chief and a better member of the JCS because of his dual and complementary responsibilities. Dual-hatting works, and it works well.

### NAVY

Secretary **LEHMAN**. I favor the continued double hatting of Service Chiefs as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and heads of their uniformed services. To do otherwise would divorce the senior uniformed member responsible for strategy formulation, operational planning and advice to the National Command Authority from a genuine knowledge of day to day service readiness to carry out its missions. Our experience in war and peace bears out the wisdom of embodying in one man the thorough knowledge of service capabilities and the authority to plan for their operational use. To do otherwise invites confusion, delay and, in time of war or crises, disaster. Each Service Chief has a duly appointed assistant of four star rank who's job it is to relieve his chief of some of the day to day burdens of administering his Service. This frees a Service Chief to devote adequate time to both his service responsibilities and his duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the case of both the Navy and Marine Corps, the system and the Service Chiefs, Admiral Watkins and General Kelley, are performing admirably. They manage Service and Joint Chiefs of Staff duties with no evidence whatsoever that Service responsibilities or loyalties would temper their joint decisionmaking capacity or advice to the detriment of the greatest national good. By avoiding fatal ivory tower organizations, dual-hatting assures realism in our Nation's top military planning.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary **ORR**. In my judgment, the demand upon the Service Chief's time is the major problem but that is ameliorated by the role that the Vice Chief of each Service plays. While the Chief devotes a great deal of attention to his Service, the Vice Chiefs focus on the day-to-day operations and, in wartime, would assume an even greater role in the overall direction of the Service. I have also heard criticisms of Service rivalries and divided loyalties. I believe the perception does not match up with the fact. We don't want a JCS that is unanimous 100 percent of the time, and we don't have that. What we have is a group of Chiefs who take their role as members of the JCS seriously and they do a good job of sorting out what's right for the Nation and what's best for their individual Services. On balance, the benefits of dual-hatting outweigh any potential disadvantages. Service Chiefs' advice and participation in the formulation of policy, strategy, and operational support are crucial. The Service Chief's responsibilities as the senior officer of his Service better qualify him to advise on its capabilities and limitations in the joint arena.

## ALTERATIONS TO DEFENSE DECISIONMAKING

Senator **THURMOND**. If you could alter the structure of our defense decisionmaking apparatus, how would you do so?

### ARMY

Secretary **MARSH**. Any adjustments I would make to our defense decisionmaking apparatus would be relatively minor adjustments. We should continue to decentralize the management of the Military Departments to the greatest extent possible. Decentralized management encourages managers at all levels to develop and implement new and innovative ideas, to accept responsibility and accountability for program execution, and to provide the Program Managers and the Military Departments with the needed flexibility to carry out their programs in an effective and prudent manner. At the same time, the many parts of our large defense establishment need to be coordinated. There is a dynamic to this constant interaction, and I believe we have sufficient flexibility built into our system and sufficient dialogue within the Department of Defense to accommodate the natural stresses of management and decisionmaking.

### NAVY

Secretary LEHMAN. Secretary Weinberger has made a greater change in the way business is done in the Pentagon than any Secretary since Forrestal. It would have been imprudent of him to attempt in addition major restructuring of the Defense Department. In fact his success has proven that major restructuring is not necessary. However, as Secretary Weinberger's decentralization matures, I believe that the benefits of two very major changes will become apparent. Number one, the size of the OSD staff and defense agencies can be reduced by an order of magnitude. Second, a considerable number of the functions now consolidated into OSD bureaucracies can be returned to the military departments at a considerable savings of money and manpower while at the same time greatly strengthening accountability. What would remain in OSD would be a much smaller far more effective and responsive staff of several hundred to assist the Secretary of Defense in his role as the President's executive agent for all defense matters and the President's senior advisor on defense.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary ORR. The framework of the system is basically sound, and we continually look for ways to improve the decisionmaking apparatus and the overall way we do business. For example, when the Services' goals are aligned and a joint effort would result in savings to the taxpayer, such management should be actively pursued. However, the pressures toward jointness and commonality shouldn't be allowed to jeopardize those programs where single Service efforts meet the requirement and are most cost effective.

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

### ADAPTATION OF EXISTING WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Senator NUNN. What mechanisms can be established or strengthened to insure that when a Service develops a new weapons system requirement that it looks at the programs of sister Services or our allies for possible adaptation of an existing or emerging weapons system?

### ARMY

Secretary MARSH. A mechanism under consideration by OSD, the Services and Joint Staff is the establishment of a Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRMB). Membership would be composed of senior Service representatives, perhaps on the Vice Chief of Staff level. The purpose of the JRMB would be to systematically evaluate requirements, programs and technology, identify potential joint acquisition program candidates and resolve cross-Service issues once a joint program is underway.

In another related effort, the Departments of the Army and the Air Force recently reaffirmed that to fulfill their roles in meeting the national security objectives of deterrence and defense, they must jointly field and train forces that are able to conduct effective airland combat operations. To that purpose, the two Departments initiated a joint U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Force Development Process to develop in a deliberate manner the most combat effective, affordable joint forces necessary for airland combat operations. The Departments established a joint group, consisting of a colonel and five or six additional officers from each service, charged with developing a plan to ensure coordinated programs for the Army and Air Force in the fiscal year 1986–90 Program Objective Memoranda, and future Memoranda.

The Joint U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Force Development Group's objective, in the broadest terms, is to develop a means of designing and fielding the best affordable airland combat force which minimizes system duplication without jeopardizing force effectiveness. The Group will:

Identify realistic resource constraints;

Accommodate, synthesize, coordinate service roles and missions for airland combat operations;

Eliminate unnecessary duplication, focusing especially on areas in which service missions and systems overlap;

Identify affordable systems and forces with which the two services would conduct airland combat operations; and

Design command and control schemes which optimize combat effectiveness in conducting airland combat operations.

With regard to weapons systems developed by our allies, we give them early consideration in our analyses for determining solutions to U.S. weapon systems needs.

### NAVY

Secretary LEHMAN. Mechanisms are already in place to insure that ongoing R&D or other programs of other Services and allies are examined for possible adaptation to existing or emerging weapons system requirements. The JCS also closely monitors cross-Service programs for timeliness prioritization and funding adequacy. Various research, development, and testing centers exist in the NATO structure, manned with a multi-national staff. The NATO ASW research center at La Spezia, Italy is just one example. Our bilateral exchanges of military information with friends and allies keep us abreast of developments in our respective countries which we examine closely for application to our own requirements. I do not think new mechanisms or staff structures are necessary or desirable to improve our knowledge of or adaptation of other Service or foreign weapons systems development. The record will show that there has been no lack of enthusiasm for the military departments in attempting to utilize the developments of sister Services and of allies thereby saving scarce obligational authority. Unfortunately, this enthusiasm has more often than not been frustrated by congressional actions like the recent cancellation of the British "Dry Hawk" program.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary ORR. Several initiatives are under way within the Department of Defense to strengthen mechanisms by which the Services seek opportunities for adapting existing or emerging weapons systems from sister Services or our allies to satisfy new weapons system requirements. The Joint Logistics Commanders (JLC), comprising the Commanders of the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, Air Force Systems Command, and Air Force Logistics Command and the Chief of Naval Material have cooperated for over 20 years to formally promote commonality among the Services in components and subsystems. In August 1983, the JLC adopted a recommendation by the Commander, Air Force Systems Command, to sponsor a task force to strengthen joint cooperation in the acquisition of weapon systems. The principal aims of the JLC task force are to determine how to do a better job of identifying candidates for joint acquisition and enhance the execution of joint acquisition programs. The task force plans to report its findings and recommendations to the JLC in early 1984.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering chartered a Defense Science Board (DSB) 1983 Summer Study panel on Joint Service Acquisition Programs. The main conclusion of that study was that there was a need to institutionalize the "front end" process of harmonizing multi-service requirements at program initiation. Recommendations by the DSB panel are currently under review and preliminary implementation has begun within OSD, the JCS, and the Services.

The major mechanism for promoting NATO interoperability and standardization is the annual NATO Armaments Planning Review, which publishes the NATO Consolidated Defense Equipment Schedule. DOD, with the cooperation of NATO, has spearheaded an effort over the last year to make the schedule more effective. As a result of this effort, the 1984 schedule will be more comprehensive and more detailed. A related NATO initiative involving exploiting emerging technologies to improve conventional defenses has been undertaken. This program should promote joint weapon systems developments and related coproduction. Examples of ongoing programs which fall under this emerging technologies initiative include the Long Range Standoff Missile, the Short Range Anti-Radiation Missile, and the Low Cost Powered Dispenser.

As these initiatives demonstrate, OSD and the Services are taking aggressive action to adapt and exploit existing or emerging weapons systems to satisfy new weapons system requirements.

### RESTRUCTURING DOD TO FOSTER JOINT SERVICE PROGRAMS

Senator NUNN. How can the Department of Defense be restructured to insure greater cooperation and success in joint Service programs such as the JTACMS, JSTARS, and JVX programs?

What can be done on the civilian side and what can be done on the uniformed Services side to foster joint programs where they are desirable?

#### ARMY

Secretary MARSH. I do not believe a restructuring of DOD is necessary to insure greater cooperation and success in joint Service programs. My earlier response concerning the establishment of a Joint Requirements and Management Board, and a Joint U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Development Group relates to this question. These cooperative efforts are examples of initiatives which are ongoing to improve the success of joint development programs.

#### NAVY

Secretary LEHMAN. A great deal has been done in the area of cross-Service programs. In preparing budget 85, the Service programers identified over 80 cross-Service programs such as JTACMS, JSTARS, and JVX. At the time the Services programs for budget 1985 were submitted to the Secretary of Defense all but 7 cross-Service programs were funded and reviewed to the complete satisfaction of the Service programers, Chiefs, and Secretaries. Those few programs where some disagreement existed as to priority or funding level were thoroughly discussed and commented on by the JCS and resolved within the mechanism of the DRB if necessary. We have a system now that is very sensitive to cross-Service programs. That system, as I have illustrated, works. I don't think we need do anything, either on the military or civilian side of DOD management and leadership, to the mechanisms currently in place for ensuring the proper development, funding, and fielding of cross-Service programs.

#### AIR FORCE

Secretary ORR. Both the Joint Logistics Commanders (JLC) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDRE) have sponsored studies to determine how to achieve greater cooperation and success in joint service programs. While the JLC study is currently in progress, the USDRE sponsored study, conducted by a Defense Science Board (DSB) 1983 Summer Study panel, already has resulted in some preliminary conclusions. Chief among the DSB conclusions is the need to institutionalize the "front end" process of harmonizing multi-service requirements. Recommendations for achieving this institutionalization are currently under review, and preliminary implementation work has begun within OSD, the JCS, and the Services.

The JLC have been very active for more than 20 years in formally promoting joint acquisition of components and subsystems. The current JLC study on joint programs is aimed at promoting an analogous approach to cooperation in weapon system acquisition. The JLC effort is focused on two objectives: doing a better job of selecting candidates for joint acquisitions and improving the execution of joint acquisitions. Recommendations from the JLC study are expected to be available in early 1984.

### DEFENSE RESOURCE BOARD

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the current method of allocating resources through the Defense Resources Board (DRB) is the most efficient way of performing that function? If not, what would you suggest? If so, how would you improve it?

#### ARMY

Secretary MARSH. The Defense Resources Board functions to assist the Secretary of Defense in the management of the DOD Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System. It reviews proposed policy, planning, and programing guidance; oversees program and budget reviews; evaluates high priority programs; and insures major acquisition systems align with the DOD PPBS. In performing these functions, the DRB draws on the expertise of its membership—DEPSECDEF, the Service Secretaries, CJCS, and the various Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Each major agency of the Department is represented on the board, thereby insuring that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretary are provided the very best judgment the Military Departments, Services, and Defense Agencies can provide. Because of this, the DRB is able to effectively air the views of the concerned parties and to recommend the allocation of the resources of the Department.

A new feature of DRB deliberations has been inclusion of the views of the commanders of the unified and specified commands who must be able to fight with the forces ultimately provided them. In developing the Defense Guidance, for example, the Commanders-in-Chief are given the opportunity to present their views directly to the DRB membership. Many of their views and suggestions have been incorporated in the decisions of the Defense Resources Board, and the Department will continue to solicit the views of our warfighting commanders. No other structure provides the level of expertise and breadth of membership that the DRB does. Final decisions, of course, are made in the first instance by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

### NAVY

Secretary LEHMAN. As mentioned elsewhere in these hearings, the Defense Resources Board has been a major innovation in the PPBS system under Secretary Weinberger. It is a mechanism that insures examination of every side of an issue in a fair, impartial manner. Every voice, whether pro or con, is heard and the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense is insured that he has heard all arguments before a policy or budgeting decision is taken. I am convinced that the DRB is the most efficient way of performing my duties to present problems and provide advice to the Secretary of Defense and his deputies. If I were to make any change to the DRB at all it would be to reduce its membership somewhat and reduce the number of annual issues from its current level of several hundred.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary ORR. The current Defense Resources Board under the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been functioning very efficiently. Under current procedures, Service Secretaries are members and Service Chiefs are invited to attend meetings and fully participate in deliberations. There is ample opportunity for a full airing of the issues prior to the decisions by the Deputy Secretary. I am comfortable with the way the board is structured and do not recommend any changes.

## SERVICE SECRETARY CONTROL OF THE SERVICE STAFF

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that providing the Service Secretary with more direct control over the Service Staff would enhance the management of defense resources and cut back on the level of inter-Service bickering, especially on weapon systems acquisition?

### ARMY

Secretary MARSH. The level of control the Service Secretary exercises over the Service Staff is more than adequate to manage defense resources. The relationship between the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff is uniformly excellent, and additional controls are not warranted.

What you refer to as inter-Service bickering is not necessarily susceptible to being alleviated by the degree of Service Secretary control over Service Staffs. On major weapons systems acquisition programs, some inter-Service staff coordination is routinely done, such as for instance between the Army and Air Staffs on systems supporting the Airland Battle.

### NAVY

Secretary LEHMAN. I do not think more direct control over a Service staff by any Service Secretary is necessary to reduce the perceived level of inter-Service disputes, especially in weapon systems acquisition. I have adequate authority over the Service staffs now. Decisions with regard to weapons system acquisition and the budget are made by me. The Service staffs work closely with my staff, the Navy Secretariat, in preparing, programs for my review and decision singly and as part of the overall budgetary construct. I would also underscore what others told the panel earlier, the perception outside the Department of Defense is that a great deal of bickering and inter-Service rivalry goes on inside the Pentagon. Those in the Pentagon know this to be a great exaggeration. The present management team, both uniformed and civilian, is dedicated to cooperation and coordination in producing the best defense possible for the resources available and as dictated by the world environment we live in. I cannot emphasize this point more. Good people, which we have, are making full use of an organizational system tailored to their needs and are making good decisions as a consequence. High caliber, competent people are what make the difference. The organizational wiring diagram is not as important as the people to whom the job is entrusted.

### AIR FORCE

Secretary ORR. No. I am more than satisfied with the support I receive from the Air Staff. The relationship between the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff is a highly satisfactory partnership. This partnership works very effectively in managing defense resources, particularly in weapons systems acquisition. The Air Force System Acquisition Review Council mechanism assures direct control of weapon system acquisition by the Secretary, who is the ultimate acquisition decision authority within the Air Force.

There is room for improvement in inter-service acquisition management. Recent initiatives by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Joint Logistics Commanders are focused on improving inter-service cooperation in weapon systems acquisition. The thrust of these initiatives is to institutionalize the process for harmonizing multi-service requirements at the "front end" of joint acquisitions.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, November 3, 1983.]

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